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ABSTRACT 
  Export processing zones (EPZs) are statutorily created investment 
parks that developing countries establish to attract foreign investment 
in exchange for government-granted fiscal incentives. At their core, 
EPZs are a quid pro quo between host governments and investor 
companies: in exchange for the promise of job creation, technological 
transfer, economic development, and compliance with export 
performance requirements, investor companies receive substantial 
fiscal incentives, such as tax and tariff exemptions. 
  Most EPZ statutes are inconsistent with Article 3.1(a) of the World 
Trade Organization’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM Agreement) because EPZ incentives qualify as 
prohibited export subsidies. Fortunately, many developing countries 
have received exemptions from this prohibition to maintain their EPZ 
systems. The exemptions, however, are set to permanently expire for 
many countries on December 31, 2015, spurring the need for EPZ 
reform. 
  This Note proposes a framework for achieving WTO-compliance 
for EPZ statutes by conditioning EPZ incentives on an investor 
company’s implementation of standards of corporate social 
responsibility. This proposal will permit developing countries to 
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maintain fiscal incentives—thus helping preserve their economic 
competitiveness as attractive destinations for foreign investment—
while also offsetting potential harm that the mandatory elimination of 
EPZ export requirements may cause to developing-country industries. 
INTRODUCTION 
Just after takeoff, attentive passengers flying out of Managua, 
Nicaragua’s international airport can catch a glimpse of Las Mercedes 
Industrial Park, a foreign investment park where companies have 
established operations that employ about twenty four thousand 
workers.1 A walk through the investment park’s streets will reveal a 
surprisingly bustling batch of merchants catering to workers and 
passersby. With such a dynamic pedestrian culture, it may seem as if 
Las Mercedes were its own city of economic activity, providing 
employment opportunities for workers and an economic stimulus for 
the surrounding communities. 
Las Mercedes is a quintessential example of an export processing 
zone (EPZ). EPZs are geographically delimited areas that developing 
countries establish to attract foreign investment in exchange for fiscal 
incentives granted by the host government.2 EPZs, which “range in 
size from single factories to large cities,”3 have been called “vehicles 
of globalization”4 and “essential tools” of economic growth for 
developing countries.5 EPZs employ sixty eight million people 
worldwide, or about 3 percent of the global workforce,6 and exist in 
 
 1. CONSULADO GENERAL DE NICAR. EN MIAMI, FLA., NICARAGUA’S EXPORT 
PROCESSING ZONES 1, available at http://www.consuladonicamiami.com/pdf/exportprocessing
zones.pdf. 
 2. Stephen Creskoff & Peter Walkenhorst, Implications of WTO Disciplines for Special 
Economic Zones in Developing Countries 7–8 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 4892, 2009), available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-
9450-4892. Countries refer to EPZs by varying names, including industrial free zones, export 
free zones, foreign trade zones, free zones, and investment promotion zones, among others. Id. 
 3. Id. at 7. 
 4. Jamie K. McCallum, Export Processing Zones: Comparative Data from China, 
Honduras, Nicaragua and South Africa 1 (Geneva Int’l Labour Office, Working Paper No. 21, 
2011), available at http://www.ilo.org/ifpdial/information-resources/publications/WCMS_158364/
lang--en/index.htm (quotation marks omitted). 
 5. Telephone Interview with Carlos Zúñiga, Dir., Nat’l Comm’n of Free Zones of Nicar. 
(Nov. 9, 2012). 
 6. McCallum, supra note 4, at 2. 
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over 119 countries7 across Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, the 
Middle East, and sub-Saharan Africa.8 
EPZs bring substantial investment to developing countries. In 
Costa Rica, for example, EPZs account for about half of all foreign 
direct investment in the country.9 In Haiti, former U.S. President Bill 
Clinton and then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton helped launch a 
new EPZ in October 2012 as part of U.S. efforts to help put Haiti on a 
path toward “sustainable economic growth” and “‘long-term 
prosperity.’”10 This EPZ is expected to create twenty thousand jobs 
and provide homes for five thousand families.11 
Despite the important role that EPZs play in sustainable 
economic development, it is not widely known that most EPZs are 
inconsistent with the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement).12 
Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement prohibits “subsidies contingent, 
in law or in fact . . . upon export performance.”13 As explained later in 
this Note, EPZ fiscal incentives qualify as subsidies conditioned on 
export performance14 because most EPZ statutes require companies 
to export most or all of their products as a condition of receiving the 
statutorily enumerated incentives.15 Thus, all WTO members that 
maintain EPZs with fiscal incentives and de jure or de facto export 
requirements are in prima facie breach of their WTO obligations. 
 
 7. FOREIGN INV. ADVISORY SERV., WORLD BANK GRP., SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: 
PERFORMANCE, LESSONS LEARNED, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ZONE DEVELOPMENT 23 (2008), 
available at https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/uploads/SEZs%20-%20Performance,%
20Lessons%20Learned%20and%20Implications%20for%20Zone%20Development.pdf. 
 8. See id. at 26 tbl.13 (listing the number of EPZs in each region of the world). 
 9. RICARDO MONGE GONZÁLEZ, JULIO ROSALES TIJERINO & GILBERTO ARCE 
ALPÍZAR, ORGANIZCIÓN DE LOS ESTADOS AMERICANOS, ANÁLISIS COSTO-BENEFICIO DEL 
RÉGIMEN DE ZONAS FRANCAS: IMPACTOS DE LA INVERSIÓN EXTRANJERA DIRECTA EN 
COSTA RICA 2 (2005), available at http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2011/09337.pdf.  
 10. Clintons Open Haiti Industry Park, BBC (Oct. 22, 2012, 7:04 PM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-20037360 (quoting Hillary Clinton, Secretary of 
State of the United States). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 
[hereinafter SCM Agreement]. 
 13. Id. art. 3.1(a). 
 14. See infra Part II.  
 15. See, e.g., Export Processing Zone Act, ch. 280, art. 8.3 (2000) (Belize) (prohibiting the 
sale of EPZ products in Belize). 
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Fortunately, Article 27 of the SCM Agreement grants certain 
developing nations an exemption from Article 3.1(a) by specifying 
that countries listed in Annex VII of the SCM Agreement are exempt 
from Article 3.1(a)’s prohibition on export subsidies.16 Annex VII 
states that countries identified as either a least-developed country 
(LDC) by the United Nations or countries with a Gross National 
Product (GNP) per capita of less than $1,00017 are exempt from 
Article 3.1(a)’s prohibition on export subsidies.18 When a non-LDC’s 
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita19 surpasses the $1,000 
threshold for three consecutive years, however, it “graduates” from 
the list and must comply with Article 3.1(a).20 
Until recently, this exemption protected many EPZs that would 
otherwise have violated the SCM Agreement. Even when a 
developing country neither held LDC status nor had a GNI per capita 
of less than $1,000, the WTO Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM Committee) often granted ad hoc 
extensions to EPZs,21 perhaps recognizing how hard developing 
countries had fought for the exemption during the negotiation of the 
SCM Agreement.22 
 
 16. See SCM Agreement art. 27.2(a) (“The prohibition of paragraph 1(a) of Article 3 shall 
not apply to . . . developing country Members referred to in Annex VII.”). 
 17. See World Trade Organization, Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, ¶ 10.1, 
WT/MIN(01)/17, 41 I.L.M 757, 761–62 (2002). The $1,000 threshold is in terms of 1990 dollars. 
Id. The peg to 1990 dollars acts as a mathematical hedge against the risk that a country will 
surpass the threshold solely due to exchange rate fluctuations. For instance, even if the dollar 
were to depreciate heavily against a foreign currency, the per capita income of the country in 
1990 dollars would not change. 
 18. SCM Agreement Annex VII. 
 19. The World Bank data series previously published as GNP is now published as GNI. 
The difference in terminology between GNP and GNI reflects the implementation of the 1993 
System of National Accounts. See INTER-SECRETARIAT WORKING GRP. ON NAT’L ACCOUNTS, 
SYSTEM OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 1993 (1993), at 55, 650 (defining GNI). This Note refers to 
the measure as GNI. 
 20. SCM Agreement Annex VII. In this Note, those countries that no longer meet either 
exemption of Annex VII are referred to as graduating countries. As explained, these are the 
countries that must implement EPZ reform no later than December 31, 2015. See infra note 94 
and accompanying text. 
 21. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE & U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
SUBSIDIES ENFORCEMENT ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 25 (2010), available at 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/esel/reports/seo2010/seo-annual-report-2010.pdf (“[In 2009], the Subsidies 
Committee conducted a detailed review of more than 40 export subsidy programs. At the end of 
the process, all of the extension requests were granted.”). 
 22. See infra Part II.A. 
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In 2007, the SCM Committee decided to phase out its practice of 
granting extensions to developing countries that did not meet either 
condition for the exemption and set a final deadline of December 31, 
2015, for making EPZ statutes in these countries WTO-compliant.23 A 
2012 WTO report lists the five countries that have graduated from 
both conditions and are thus subject to the December 31, 2015, 
deadline.24 More importantly, multiple countries that are not on 
Annex VII’s list but have been continuing EPZ regimes with ad hoc 
extensions25 must also comply with the 2015 deadline. 
Some developing countries subject to the 2015 deadline have 
tried unsuccessfully to reform their EPZ statutes.26 Others have 
succeeded in promulgating EPZ reforms, but their full compliance 
with Article 3.1(a) is questionable.27 This Note formulates a strategy 
for developing countries to use in effectively modifying their EPZ 
statutes to comply fully with Article 3.1(a)’s prohibition on export 
subsidies while also maintaining their economic competitiveness and 
encouraging corporate social responsibility (CSR) by foreign 
investors. 
Both objectives are critical components of EPZ reform. 
Maintaining economic competitiveness is essential because foreign 
firms have the ability and resources to relocate easily to another 
 
 23. Report (2007) of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Oct. 27, 
2006–Oct. 25, 2007, ¶ 18 n.6., G/L/840 (Nov. 12, 2007); see OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE & U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 21, at 25 (“An important outcome 
of these negotiations, insisted upon by the United States and other developed and developing 
countries, was that [developing countries] have no further recourse to extensions beyond 
2015.”). LDCs and countries with GNI per capita of less than $1,000, however, will continue to 
enjoy the exemption until they no longer meet either condition because it is only the extensions 
that are discontinued past 2015. Id.; see SCM Agreement Annex VII. 
 24. Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Note by the Secretariat: 
Updating GNP Per Capita for Members Listed in Annex VII(b) as Foreseen in Paragraph 10.1 of 
the Doha Ministerial Decision and in Accordance with the Methodology in G/SCM/38, ¶ 3, 
G/SCM/110/Add.9 (June 20, 2012). Countries that have reached the $1,000 threshold include the 
Dominican Republic, Egypt, Guatemala, Morocco, and the Philippines. Id. Several other 
countries, including the Congo, Cameroon, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Senegal, and 
Sri Lanka have a GNI per capita that is within only a few hundred dollars of the $1,000 
threshold. Id. 
 25. For example, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, El Salvador, Fiji, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Mauritius, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Lucia are operating their EPZ regimes 
based on ad hoc extensions. See Report (2007) of the Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, supra note 23, ¶ 18 n.6. (listing countries that were granted extensions 
for the 2008 calendar year). 
 26. See infra notes 146–49 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra Part III.B.1. 
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country that offers a more attractive legal framework for investment.28 
Developing countries should also reform their EPZs as soon as 
possible because foreign investors crave legal certainty.29 
CSR is also an important goal of EPZ reform. CSR is a 
corporation’s commitment to advance positive social change by 
improving worker conditions, increasing environmental protections, 
and facilitating community involvement and development.30 For 
example, a corporation dedicated to CSR might implement 
progressive policies such as permitting worker unionization, taking 
extra precautions to protect the environment, and offering 
scholarships for higher education to students in the local community. 
As described later in this Note, conditioning EPZ incentives upon 
objective standards of CSR will enable countries to comply fully with 
Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement while maintaining the economic 
competitiveness of a country’s EPZ system.31 In contrast to other 
attempted reforms, an EPZ system based on CSR conditions will 
offer investors much-needed legal certainty that is often a 
prerequisite to attracting investment. 
In addition to providing an economically feasible path to WTO 
compliance for EPZ systems, CSR can help address cases of 
inadequate working conditions and the prevention of worker 
 
 28. See Ingrid Franco, Adozona Espera que Impacto No Sea para el Sector, LISTIN DIARIO 
(Nov. 1, 2012, 11:57 AM), http://www.listin.com.do/economia-y-negocios/2012/10/31/253317/
Adozona-espera-que-impacto-no-sea-para-el-sector (“[A new tax on dividends] may put [the 
Dominican Republic] at a competitive disadvantage and would be an important factor for the 
investor to consider . . . .” (quoting Aquiles Bermúdez, President of the Dominican Association 
of Free Trade Zones) (author’s translation)); Kelssin Iván Vásquez, Inseguridad Promueve 
Fuga de Maquilas Hacia Nicaragua, EL HERALDO (July 22, 2012, 6:50 PM), 
http://www.elheraldo.hn/Secciones-Principales/Economia/Inseguridad-promueve-fuga-de-
maquilas-hacia-Nicaragua (explaining that investment is flowing from Honduras to Nicaragua 
because “[t]he government of Nicaragua has a lower minimum wage than [Honduras] and it 
offers [investors] land to build industrial facilities for free” (quoting Arturo Chávez, Executive 
Director of the Foundation of Investments and Exports) (author’s translation)). 
 29. Legal certainty is “the ability of people or legal entities to plan their future activities 
taking the potential legal consequences of their conduct into consideration.” Camilo A. 
Rodriguez Yong, Enhancing Legal Certainty in Colombia: The Role of the Andean Community, 
17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 407, 411–12 (2009). For EPZ investors, legal certainty includes knowing 
whether an EPZ statute is consistent with WTO law. See, e.g., Guadalupe Hernández, Una Ley 
Obsoleta No Permitirá Más Inversiones en las Zonas Francas, EL SALVADOR (Aug. 11, 2011), 
http://www.elsalvador.com/mwedh/nota/nota_completa.asp?idCat=6374&idArt=6085440 (“[I]t 
is important to define [new EPZ legislation] as soon as possible so [EPZ] investments have legal 
certainty.” (author’s translation)); Vásquez, supra note 28 (considering lack of “legal certainty” 
as a disincentive for EPZ investors (author’s translation)). 
 30. See Part IV.A. 
 31. See infra Part IV.B. 
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unionization, among other labor issues, that remain significant 
problems in the global trading system.32 CSR can do so by harnessing 
competitive market forces to give all actors in EPZ systems—the 
WTO, host governments, and private companies—an interest in 
working toward social improvement.33 
This Note chooses depth over breadth in focusing on one aspect 
of EPZ reform: compliance with Article 3.1(a)’s prohibition of de jure 
and de facto export subsidization. Though other issues regarding EPZ 
reform exist,34 compliance with Article 3.1(a) is among the most 
pressing issues confronting developing countries. This Note analyzes 
compliance with Article 3.1(a) using sources such as EPZ statutes and 
the SCM Agreement, Inter-American Development Bank reports, 
WTO panel and Appellate Body decisions, and interviews with a 
government official and an economist in Nicaragua. 
Although some scholars have discussed how EPZs are 
inconsistent with WTO law and have even proposed potential 
solutions for achieving WTO compliance,35 the existing literature has 
yet to formulate a full defense for conditioning EPZ incentives on 
CSR that ensures legal compliance while also taking into account the 
potential policy repercussions of EPZ reform. In contrast with 
existing literature, this Note addresses both the legal and policy 
implications of EPZ reform at a time in which developing countries 
must act to meet a fast-approaching deadline. 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the functions 
that EPZs perform in developing countries, focusing on the creation 
and expansion of export industries. In setting forth the most relevant 
components of an EPZ legal framework, Part I also briefly 
 
 32. See THOMAS FAROLE, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA: COMPARING 
PERFORMANCE AND LEARNING FROM GLOBAL EXPERIENCES 100 (2011) (“Perhaps the single 
biggest concern identified across the zones is poor enforcement of agreed-upon labor standards, 
working conditions, and pay and benefits. Although most zone programs have made significant 
progress in the past decade . . . enforcement lags considerably in many programs.”); McCallum, 
supra note 4, at 3–5 (describing international problems with inadequate labor conditions and the 
prevention of worker unionization in various countries). 
 33. See infra Part IV.B. 
 34. For example, countries must also eliminate domestic-content requirements to comply 
with Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement. See SCM Agreement art. 3.1(b). 
 35. See generally JAIME GRANADOS, INTER-AM. DEV. BANK, EXPORT PROCESSING 
ZONES AND OTHER SPECIAL REGIMES IN THE CONTEXT OF MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAL 
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (2003) (explaining the interaction of WTO law and EPZ statutes); 
Creskoff & Walkenhorst, supra note 2 (noting the many ways in which EPZ statutes can be 
inconsistent with WTO law and offering potential reforms). 
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summarizes relevant provisions in Guatemala’s EPZ statute, a typical 
example of an EPZ statute. Part II details relevant WTO law 
applicable to EPZs, including provisions of the SCM Agreement as 
well as WTO case law that sets forth the legal tests for de facto export 
subsidization with which graduating countries must comply by 2015. 
Part II concludes by synthesizing the key elements of WTO law 
relevant to EPZ reform. Part III discusses potential policy 
implications that governments must consider before embarking on 
reform and explains the inadequacies of past EPZ reform attempts. 
Part IV sets forth a legal framework that allows graduating countries 
to maintain fiscal incentives while conditioning such incentives on 
standards of CSR. Part IV also addresses potential counterarguments 
that opponents may make regarding EPZ reform based upon CSR 
conditionality. The Note concludes by encouraging timely EPZ 
reforms based upon CSR as a path toward WTO compliance, 
economic competitiveness, improved labor standards, and legal 
certainty for investors. 
I.  EPZS AS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TOOLS 
Before discussing proposals for EPZ reform, it is necessary to 
examine the substance of EPZ statutes and their role in sustainable 
economic development. Understanding the mechanics of EPZ 
statutes will illustrate the economic importance of EPZs, particularly 
their export-increasing potential.36 Given that EPZs also play a large 
role in the infrastructural development of developing countries,37 
 
 36. The exports generated by EPZs are economically beneficial to developing countries. 
Evidence shows that “[t]here is a clear positive relationship between export growth and GDP 
growth” for developing countries. WILLIAM R. CLINE, TRADE POLICY AND GLOBAL POVERTY 
42 (2004). Empirical models have demonstrated that export growth is “highly significant” when 
regressed against GDP growth, with each percentage point of export growth being associated 
with a rise of 0.15 percentage points in GDP. Id. Although exports have potential benefits for 
economic growth in developing countries, significant potential disadvantages also exist that 
countries must consider. Developing countries that rely on primary products exports can 
experience “a high degree of exposure to risk and uncertainty” when prices fluctuate in world 
markets. JUAN FELIPE MEJA, EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: AN 
ANALYSIS OF COLOMBIA’S EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION’S MARKET 
31 (2011). Countries can mitigate this risk through export diversification. See id. (“[E]xport 
diversification has been proposed as a policy mechanism seeking to stabilize export 
earnings . . . .”). Other commentators have hypothesized that exports do not cause but are 
rather merely correlated with economic growth. Id. at 29. 
 37. EPZs bring well-developed infrastructure such as electricity services, water services, 
telecommunications services, and transportation infrastructure for the exportation of products. 
See infra Part I.B. Weaknesses in this infrastructure are “major constraints on investment and 
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understanding their statutory mechanics will demonstrate the 
prominence of EPZs in economic development generally.38 
This Part introduces the concept of an EPZ in two sections. 
Section A gives a general overview of the legal frameworks of EPZs 
and their operation in developing countries. Section B provides a 
specific example of an EPZ statute: the Guatemalan EPZ statute. 
A. An Overview of EPZs 
EPZs are key tools that developing countries use to attract 
foreign investment. National legislatures establish EPZs to 
accomplish policy goals such as generating employment, promoting 
the acquisition of technology, encouraging foreign investment, and 
increasing a country’s exports.39 EPZ statutes offer attractive 
incentives to companies, including an exemption from income tax for 
a statutorily specified term of years, tax-free importation of 
production equipment, a waiver of administrative and property taxes, 
and a reprieve from value-added taxes for goods transferred between 
EPZs.40 Savings can be significant; for instance, companies can accrue 
over $20 million in income-tax savings alone.41 In short, EPZs are a 
quid pro quo: in exchange for the promise of job creation, 
technological transfer, and economic development, investor 
companies receive substantial fiscal incentives. 
 
operations in many developing countries.” Chris Milner, Constraints to Export Development in 
the Developing Countries, in THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 213, 229 (Homi Katrak 
& Roger Strange eds., 2004). Relatively high levels of “water supply interruptions, power 
breakdowns, or voltage fluctuations” can lead to “export-oriented investment . . . [being] 
diverted from the affected countries.” Id. at 230. Hence, the fiscal incentives for both public and 
private development of EPZs offer a developing country much-needed infrastructure that will 
help them compete in the global marketplace as investment destinations. 
 38. Especially important for economic development is that exports from EPZs provide a 
type of economic insurance for developing countries because the exports of EPZs remain strong 
even when other sectors of the economy fail. See, e.g., Press Release, World Trade Org., 
Economic Reforms Take Hold in the Dominican Republic: But Obstacles for Export Sectors 
Remain (Feb. 2, 1996), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp25_e.htm 
(“Exports from [EPZs] . . . increased continuously at times when other exports [had] 
decreased.”). EPZs have been called “one of the most important and dynamic sectors” in the 
Dominican Republic. Id. 
 39. See, e.g., Ley que Establece un Régimen Especial, Integral y Simplificado para el 
Establecimiento y Operación de Zonas Francas y Dicta Otras Disposiciones [Law To Establish 
a Special, Integrated and Simplified Regime for the Establishment and Operation of Free Zones 
and Other Dispositions], Ley No. 32, 5 Apr. 2011, ch. I, art. 1, GACETA OFICIAL No. 26757-B 
(Panama) (listing the objectives of Panama’s Free Zone System). 
 40. Creskoff & Walkenhorst, supra note 2, at 29. 
 41. FAROLE, supra note 32, at 147. 
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Competition among developing countries to attract foreign 
investment is fierce. In considering a location, companies investigate 
not only a country’s EPZ incentives but also a country’s political 
stability, infrastructure, and general economic climate.42 In Central 
America, for example, some companies have moved from Honduras 
to Nicaragua, in part because production costs were 20 percent lower 
in Nicaragua.43 Nonetheless, the availability of attractive economic 
incentives remains one of the “most important criteria” for 
investors.44 
EPZs can convey enormous benefits to developing countries. For 
example, in Nicaragua, EPZs generate an estimated one hundred 
thousand direct jobs and three hundred thousand indirect jobs, both 
substantial figures in a country of six million people.45 Because EPZ 
employees pay income and social security taxes to the government, 
Nicaraguan EPZs create roughly one hundred thousand new 
taxpayers in the country.46 
Many investor companies also contribute to philanthropic 
programs in the communities of which they are a part. Some 
companies in Nicaragua’s EPZ system, for instance, have donated 
computers to schools and helped organize a cycling marathon for the 
community.47 Additionally, other companies have participated in 
Nicaragua’s “Food for the People Program,” a nutritional program 
whereby companies distribute food to their workers.48 Overall, while 
it may seem at first that EPZ companies receive overly favorable 
 
 42. See id. at 129 (“[W]e find clear evidence suggesting that investment climate matters for 
[EPZ] performance.”). 
 43. Vásquez, supra note 28.  
 44. See FAROLE, supra note 32, at 147 (listing the “level of corporate taxes” as one of the 
“most important criteria” for investors). 
 45. Telephone Interview with Carlos Zúñiga, supra note 5. An EPZ generates a direct job 
when an EPZ company employs individual workers, whereas an EPZ generates indirect jobs 
when EPZ companies consistently buy goods, such as lumber, from local companies, which can 
then in turn employ more workers. 
 46. Id. The number of new taxpayers generated by EPZs could likely be above one 
hundred thousand if at least some of the indirect jobs created also required the payment of 
income and social security taxes. 
 47. II Free Zone’s Cycling Marathon, COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE ZONAS FRANCAS, 
http://www.cnzf.gob.ni/?q=en/news/ii-free-zones-cycling-marathon (last visited Sept. 23, 2013); 
Donation to the Hogar Zacarias Guerra, COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE ZONAS FRANCAS, 
http://www.cnzf.gob.ni/?q=en/news/donation-hogar-zacarias-guerra (last visited Sept. 23, 2013). 
 48. See “Food for the People” Program for Workers at Free Zones, COMISIÓN NACIONAL 
DE ZONAS FRANCAS, http://www.cnzf.gob.ni/?q=en/news/food-people%E2%80%9D-program-
workers-free-zones (last visited Sept. 23, 2013). 
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concessions from host governments in exchange for investment, the 
companies contribute substantially to the economic and societal 
welfare of their host communities. 
B. The EPZ Statute of Guatemala: A Typical Example of an EPZ 
System 
Guatemala’s administrative framework for developing and 
implementing EPZs provides a representative example of EPZ 
statutes in other developing countries. Guatemala is thus a useful 
example with which to illustrate the dynamics of an EPZ system. 
Under Guatemala’s EPZ statute, private developers apply to the 
Political Industrial Committee, a public agency, for permission to 
operate an EPZ.49 The developers also set rental rates for production 
space.50 Once a company applies to operate within the EPZ, the 
developer will seek permission from the Political Industrial 
Committee to allow that company to operate.51 Once approved, the 
company begins producing goods or services52 and begins accruing 
benefits from the fiscal incentives of the EPZ. 
Both developers and investor companies receive fiscal incentives. 
For example, developers receive a total exemption from importation 
taxes on all machines and materials used to construct the 
infrastructure, buildings, and installations of the EPZ. Among other 
benefits, developers also pocket the rental income earned by leasing 
operating space to companies; this rental income is tax exempt for 
fifteen years.53 Investor companies import, free of taxes, all machines, 
equipment, tools, and raw materials.54 Companies also receive income 
 
 49. Ley de Zonas Francas [Law of Free Zones], Decreto No. 65-89, 14 Nov. 1989, ch. III, 
art. 11 (Guatemala), as amended by Decreto No. 25-91, 19 Mar. 1991.  
 50. Id. ch. IV, art. 16. 
 51. Id. art. 17. 
 52. Examples of common EPZ goods include textile products, automotive parts, and 
electrical devices. Examples of common EPZ services include call center services and financial 
services. Vietnam, for example, has attracted several high-profile investors including Canon, 
Samsung, Panasonic, and Intel. FAROLE, supra note 32, at 207. Honduras has attracted apparel 
companies such as Sara Lee Knit Products, which manufactures the Champion and Hanes 
brands. Id. 
 53. See Law of Free Zones, ch. V, art. 21(a)–(b). Developers are also exempt from 
administrative taxes and receive tax-free importation and consumption of fuel, oil, gas, and 
propane strictly necessary for the generation of electric energy used in operating the EPZ. Id. 
art. 21(g). 
 54. Id. art. 22. 
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tax exemptions for twelve years and are exempt from several 
administrative taxes.55 
In exchange for these incentives, both developers and investor 
companies undertake a range of obligations. First, developers must 
install and manage the services of the EPZ.56 Second, companies must 
export at least 80 percent of their products.57 Companies cannot sell 
locally without governmental permission, and when permission is 
granted to sell locally, the minimum sales contract amount is $5,000.58 
Additionally, companies must pay import and income taxes on locally 
sold products.59 
II.  WTO LAW APPLICABLE TO EPZ STATUTES 
The WTO is a supranational organization of 159 members60 
tasked with developing an “integrated, more viable and durable 
multilateral trading system.”61 To this end, WTO members negotiate 
and implement agreements62 to improve the world trading system. 
This Note will focus on the SCM Agreement, which governs the use 
of export subsidies.63 All WTO members have a duty to carry out 
their obligations under the SCM Agreement in good faith.64 In 
addition, members must take WTO tribunals’ interpretations of the 
SCM Agreement into account.65 
This Part introduces WTO law applicable to EPZs in four 
sections. Section A discusses the negotiating history of the SCM 
Agreement and its relationship to export subsidization. Section B 
discusses the issue of export subsidization in the context of the SCM 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. ch. VI, art. 36. 
 57. Id. ch. V, art. 25. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. The WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm 
(last visited Sept. 23, 2013). 
 61. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization pmbl., Apr. 15, 
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 155.  
 62. For a list of all WTO agreements, see WTO Legal Texts, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2013). 
 63. See SCM Agreement art. 3.1(a) (declaring a general prohibition on export subsidies). 
 64. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, 
¶ 278, WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 26, 2002) (noting that members should be presumed to carry out 
WTO obligations in good faith as “required by the principle of pacta sunt servanda articulated in 
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention”). 
 65. See infra Part II.C. 
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Agreement. Section C sets forth the legal standards of de jure and de 
facto export subsidization, which are of particular importance for 
making EPZ statutes WTO-compliant. Lastly, Section D summarizes 
the key implications of WTO law for EPZ reform. 
A. The SCM Agreement and Its Negotiating History with Respect to 
Export Subsidies 
The SCM Agreement governs the use of subsidies and 
countervailing measures by WTO members. Of relevance to this 
Note, it defines a subsidy as (1) a financial contribution66 (2) by a 
government or any public body67 (3) that confers a benefit on the 
recipient.68 Examples of subsidies include when “government 
revenue . . . is foregone or not collected,” “a government provides 
goods or services other than general infrastructure,” or a government 
makes “loan guarantees.”69 The SCM Agreement establishes rules 
and procedures for utilizing subsidies to provide stability to the global 
trading system. 
Export subsidies are government practices that “increase the 
profitability of export sales without similarly increasing the 
profitability of domestic sales.”70 Examples include income tax 
exemptions for profits earned on exported products and transport 
charges for export shipments with terms more favorable than those of 
domestic shipments.71 Export subsidies can be de jure or de facto: de 
jure refers to a law or practice that favors exports on its face, whereas 
de facto requires an examination of all facts and circumstances. 
The prohibition in Article 3.1(a) on de facto export subsidies 
generated sharp disagreement among countries negotiating the SCM 
Agreement. Countries supporting the de facto export subsidy 
prohibition wanted to “provide a way of dealing with the situation 
where the administration of a subsidy programme allows the 
disbursement of funds to favour exports.”72 In contrast, other 
countries proposed deleting all references to the ban on de facto 
 
 66. SCM Agreement art. 1.1(a)(1). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. art. 1.1(b). 
 69. Id. art. 1.1(a)(1)(i)–(iii). 
 70. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, ROBERT HOWSE & ANTONIA ELIASON, THE REGULATION 
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 299 (3d ed. 2005). 
 71. See SCM Agreement Annex I. 
 72. Panel Report, Australia—Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive 
Leather, ¶ 7.132, WT/DS126/R (May 25, 1999). 
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export subsidies in the text and footnotes of the SCM Agreement;73 
they expressed “concerns” about “the approach taken to 
establish . . . different categories of developing countries” that would 
be subject to different phase-out periods for the controversial 
prohibition on de facto export subsidies.74 These countries also noted 
that this categorization of countries would have “far-reaching political 
and economic implications.”75 
The protection of export subsidies for developing countries was 
also widely discussed during negotiations, with developing countries 
persistently defending export subsidies as promoting their 
developmental policy objectives and national interests.76 For example, 
Bangladesh argued that developing countries should be allowed to 
maintain export subsidies, stating that “[s]ubsidies are an integral part 
of economic development programmes of the least-developed 
countries. Accordingly, the right of the least-developed countries to 
grant or maintain subsidies, including export subsidies, shall continue 
to be recognized.”77 Developing countries also vigorously defended 
export subsidies on the ground that the subsidies were mere 
corrections for handicaps and disadvantages faced by companies 
operating in the developing world. They argued that export subsidies 
did not confer any advantages but simply leveled the playing field 
with developed countries by compensating developing countries for 
the disadvantages they face,78 such as “inadequate exploitation of 
 
 73. Negotiating Group on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Note by the Secretariat: 
Meeting of 6 November 1990, ¶ 3, MTN.GNG/NG10/24 (Nov. 29, 1990) (“It was proposed to 
delete the reference to de facto export subsidies . . . . It was also proposed to delete footnote 
4.”). 
 74. Id.; see also id. (discussing concerns regarding the application of Article 27 of the SCM 
Agreement to developing countries). 
 75. Id. 
 76. See, e.g., Negotiating Group on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Note by the 
Secretariat: Meeting of 27–28 March 1990, ¶ 12, MTN.GNG/NG10/17 (Apr. 10, 1990) 
(“[Developing countries] recalled that subsidies were an integral part of economic development 
programmes, necessary to promote social and economic policy objectives.”); Negotiating Group 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Note by the Secretariat: Meeting of 16–17 March 
1987, ¶ 9, MTN.GNG/NG10/1 (Mar. 27, 1987) (“The view was expressed that as developing 
countries had very limited financial resources, they used subsidies only for important 
development needs and could hardly afford any further commitments.”). 
 77. Negotiating Group on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, Communication from 
Bangladesh: Proposals on Behalf of the Least-Developed Countries, MTN.GNG/NG10/W/28 
(Nov. 13, 1989). 
 78. See, e.g., Negotiating Group on Subsidies and Negotiating Measures, Note by the 
Secretariat: Meeting of 20–21 February 1990, ¶ 16, MTN.GNG/NG10/16 (Mar. 20, 1990) 
(“Developing countries faced a number of external and internal distortions and the best way to 
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economics of scale, factor market imperfections, underdeveloped 
infrastructure, high costs of inputs, fragmented capital markets, 
inadequate foreign exchange market[s] and poor market 
infrastructure.”79 The subsidies were especially needed because “in 
many cases developing countries had to use subsidies to maintain 
their competitive position vis-à-vis subsidized products from 
developed countries.”80 
B. The Provisions of the SCM Agreement Regarding Export 
Subsidies 
The SCM Agreement classifies subsidies into three groups—
nonactionable, actionable, and prohibited.81 Nonactionable subsidies 
are permitted under the SCM Agreement and include “general non-
specific subsidies such as spending on education or infrastructure.”82 
Actionable subsidies are also permitted, but should not cause adverse 
effects to other WTO members.83 Actionable subsidies include 
specific forms of government assistance to firms or enterprises—such 
as giving assistance to one specific firm, firms in a specific industry, or 
firms in a geographic location.84 Prohibited subsidies are categorically 
banned absent an exemption because they can be “clearly harmful” 
and can place some members at an unfair disadvantage.85 The SCM 
Agreement identifies two types of prohibited subsidies: (1) export 
subsidies, which can be de jure or de facto, and (2) subsidies 
contingent upon the use of domestic rather than imported inputs.86 
This Note focuses on export subsidies. 
 
deal with them was to eliminate them at the source . . . . The objective of export incentives was 
not, therefore, to give an additional advantage . . . but to neutralize the handicap which 
developing countries had in their export markets and export activities.”); Negotiating Group on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Note by the Secretariat: Meeting of 19–20 October 1989, 
¶ 14, MTN.GNG/NG10/14 (Nov. 15, 1989) [hereinafter SCM Negotiating Group 19–20 Oct.] 
(acknowledging the view of some members that “any export promotion measures which put the 
exporter at par with the international norms, irrespective of the method chosen for 
compensation, should remain permissible for developing countries” (emphasis added)). 
 79. SCM Negotiating Group 19–20 Oct., supra note 78, ¶ 14. 
 80. Negotiating Group on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Note by the Secretariat: 
Meeting of 28–29 June 1988, ¶ 12, MTN.GNG/NG10/8 (July 11, 1988) (emphasis added). 
 81. See SCM Agreement pts. II, III & IV. 
 82. TREBILCOCK ET AL., supra note 70, at 375. 
 83. SCM Agreement pt. III. 
 84. Id. arts. 2.2–2.3. 
 85. See GARY P. SAMPSON, THE WTO AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 89 (2005). 
 86. See SCM Agreement art. 3.1. 
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EPZ incentive packages are prohibited export subsidies within 
the meaning of Article 3.1(a). By operation of EPZ statutes, they are 
contingent on export performance and would thus be prohibited but 
for the exemption for developing countries.87 Article 27 establishes 
this exemption by recognizing that “subsidies may play an important 
role in economic development programmes of developing country 
Members.”88 
Different categories of developing countries receive different 
levels of preferential treatment under the SCM Agreement. First, 
LDCs, as designated by the United Nations,89 are exempt from the 
prohibition on export subsidies pursuant to Annex VII(a) of the SCM 
Agreement so long as they hold that LDC designation.90 Second, an 
enumerated list of countries in Annex VII(b) are excluded from the 
prohibition on export subsidies until their GNI per capita exceeds 
$1,000 in 1990 dollars for three consecutive years.91 
Until recently, even graduating countries—that is, those 
countries that no longer meet either exemption of Annex VII—could 
maintain EPZ export subsidies indefinitely pursuant to Article 27.4 of 
the SCM Agreement. This article provides ad hoc extension periods 
for export subsidies based on the “economic, financial and 
development needs of the developing country member in question.”92 
By applying for extensions, developing countries have heavily utilized 
this provision to preserve their EPZ programs, including the financial 
incentives linked to exports.93 However, the honeymoon period of 
seemingly limitless extensions will soon come to an end: the WTO 
 
 87. For example, as demonstrated above, Guatemala’s EPZ statute requires companies to 
export 80 percent of their products, a condition on export performance. See supra note 57 and 
accompanying text. This would violate Article 3.1(a) but for the developing-country exemption.  
 88. SCM Agreement art. 27.1. 
 89. For a list of LDCs, see Least Developed Countries: About LDCs, UNITED NATIONS 
OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 
http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/25 (last visited Sept. 23, 2013). 
 90. See SCM Agreement Annex VII(a). 
 91. See supra note 17. The list of countries in Annex VII includes Bolivia, Cameroon, 
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, 
India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, and 
Zimbabwe. For a list of those countries that have graduated from this list, see Committee on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 24, ¶ 3 n.4. 
 92. SCM Agreement art. 27.4. 
 93. For a list of countries that have been granted their requested extensions for the 
maintenance of export subsidies, see OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE & U.S. 
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 21, at 25. 
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General Council recently mandated that the final group of extensions 
will expire on December 31, 2015.94 
In accordance with this mandate, developing country members 
must design an “action plan” detailing how they will bring their EPZ 
programs into compliance with WTO law.95 The action plan “shall 
indicate how the Member intends to eliminate export 
subsidies . . . including information as to legislative changes, 
administrative amendments and/or other procedures as may be 
necessary.”96 To do this, developing countries will need to understand 
exactly how WTO tribunals have interpreted Article 3.1(a), especially 
the de facto export subsidization standard. 
C. De Jure and De Facto Export Subsidies 
Several WTO dispute settlement panels and the WTO Appellate 
Body have interpreted the meaning of both de jure and de facto 
export subsidies and have announced standards regarding what 
evidence a complaining country must show to prove a prima facie 
violation of WTO law.97 The Appellate Body in Canada – Aircraft98 
described the difference between de jure and de facto export 
subsidies as one of “what evidence may be employed to prove that a 
subsidy is export contingent.”99 De jure export subsidies are proven 
“on the basis of the words of the relevant legislation, regulation or 
other legal instrument.”100 In contrast, de facto export subsidies are 
 
 94. WTO General Council, Article 27.4 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures—Decision of 27 July 2007, ¶ 1(d), WT/L/691 (July 27, 2007). 
 95. Id. ¶ 1(f). 
 96. Id. ¶ 1(f) n.5. 
 97. A complaining country must first show a prima facie violation of the SCM Agreement 
before the responding country is required to present evidence. See Legal Issues Arising in WTO 
Dispute Settlement Proceedings: 10.6 Burden of Proof, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c10s6p1_e.htm (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2013) (“As regards the required level of proof, the Appellate Body has clarified that 
the party bearing the burden of proof must put forward evidence sufficient to make a prima 
facie case (a presumption) that what is claimed is true. When that prima facie case is made, the 
onus shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it submits sufficient evidence to disprove the 
claim, thus rebutting the presumption.” (citing Appellate Body Report, Korea—Definitive 
Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, ¶ 145, WT/DS98/AB/R (Dec. 14, 
1999))). 
 98. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, 
WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999) [hereinafter Canada – Aircraft Appellate Body Report]. 
 99. Id. ¶ 167. 
 100. Id. 
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proven “from the total configuration of the facts constituting and 
surrounding the granting of the subsidy.”101 
Interpretations of de facto subsidization have focused on 
Footnote 4 of the SCM Agreement, which elaborates on Article 
3.1(a)’s prohibition of “subsidies contingent, in law or in 
fact, . . . upon export performance” in the following terms: 
This standard is met when the facts demonstrate that the granting of 
a subsidy, without having been made legally contingent upon export 
performance, is in fact tied to actual or anticipated exportation or 
export earnings. The mere fact that a subsidy is granted to 
enterprises which export shall not for that reason alone be 
considered to be an export subsidy within the meaning of this 
provision.102 
WTO panels have set forth two tests for determining de facto 
export subsidies: the “but-for” test established by Canada – Aircraft 
and the “close-connection” test established by a second case, 
Australia – Automotive Leather II.103 Insofar as WTO jurists will apply 
these standards to determine the legality of all EPZs, this Note 
discusses the cases in some detail. 
1. Canada – Aircraft and the But-For Test of De Facto 
Contingency. In Canada – Aircraft, the Canadian government 
provided loans to the civil aircraft industry at below-market rates of 
return, loans that thus qualified as a subsidy.104 In a decision upheld 
fully by the Appellate Body in both its interpretation and its 
application of de facto contingency,105 the WTO panel held that the 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. SCM Agreement art. 3.1(a) & n.4. 
 103. Panel Report, Australia – Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive 
Leather, WT/DS126/R (May 25, 1999) [hereinafter Australia – Automotive Leather II Panel 
Report]. The WTO officially refers to this decision as Australia – Automotive Leather II, even 
though no panel decision entitled Australia – Automotive Leather I exists, perhaps due to the 
fact that a “panel was established in January 1998 on the same matter and involving the same 
parties, but was never composed.” WORLD TRADE ORG., WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: ONE-
PAGE CASE SUMMARIES 50 n.3 (2012) http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/
dispu_summary95_11_e.pdf. 
 104. See Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, ¶ 9.314, 
WT/DS70/R (Apr. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Canada – Aircraft Panel Report] (“[The Canadian 
Government] neither seeks nor earns a commercial rate of return on these contributions.”). 
 105. See Canada – Aircraft Appellate Body Report, supra note 98, ¶ 220(b) (concluding that 
the Appellate Body “upholds the Panel’s interpretation and application of the expression 
‘contingent . . . in fact . . . upon export performance’ and the Panel’s finding” (alteration in 
original) (emphasis added) (quoting SCM Agreement art. 3.1(a))). 
WATERS IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 10/9/2013  12:36 PM 
2013] REFORMING EXPORT PROCESSING ZONES 499 
low-cost loans were de facto export subsidies.106 The panel interpreted 
the standard “contingent . . . in fact . . . upon export performance”107 
to be met when “the facts demonstrate that such [government] 
assistance would not have been granted . . . but for anticipated 
exportation or export earnings.”108 The facts do not have to show that 
export performance is an actual condition of receiving fiscal 
incentives but only that “had there been no expectation of export 
sales . . . ‘ensuing’ from the subsidy, the subsidy would not have been 
granted.”109 The but-for test is thus a less stringent standard than an 
actual showing that a country requires export performance as a 
condition of receiving fiscal incentives. 
The panel then applied this standard to the Canadian 
government’s low-cost loans. The panel considered several 
circumstantial factors: (1) the governmental “Business Plan” 
referencing “high export potential” as a motivation for giving the 
loans, (2) a governmental annual report boasting that “[e]xports 
accounted for about 70 percent of sales,” (3) a governmental press 
release describing the loans as “generating economic growth and 
export dollars,” (4) governmental website material referring to 
increased exports as a motivating factor for the loans, (5) loan 
application materials requiring applicants to distinguish between 
domestic sales and exports when reporting forecast and actual sales, 
and (6) legislative charters identifying increased exports as a 
consideration of the program.110 On these facts, the panel concluded 
that the low-cost loans would not have been granted but for the 
anticipated export earnings.111 Although actual conditionality was not 
established, the panel nonetheless deemed Canada’s loans to be 
export subsidies.112 
The Appellate Body, upon review, “[upheld] the Panel’s 
interpretation and application of the expression ‘contingent . . . in 
 
 106. Canada – Aircraft Panel Report, supra note 104, ¶ 10.1. 
 107. SCM Agreement art. 3.1(a). 
 108. Canada – Aircraft Panel Report, supra note 104, ¶¶ 9.331–9.332. 
 109. Id. ¶ 9.339 (emphasis omitted). The panel emphasized the factual nature of this inquiry 
and emphasized that panels can consider any facts in making the determination. Id. ¶ 9.337 
(“[A]ny fact could be relevant, provided it ‘demonstrates’ . . . whether or not a subsidy would 
have been granted but for anticipated exportation or export earnings.”). 
 110. Id. ¶ 9.340 (emphases omitted). 
 111. See id. ¶ 9.341 (“To us, therefore, these facts demonstrate that [the government’s] 
assistance to the Canadian regional aircraft industry would not have been granted but for some 
expectation of exportation or export earnings.”). 
 112. Id. ¶ 10.1. 
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fact . . . upon export performance,’”113 agreeing that the Panel’s 
decision to apply a but-for test was the appropriate approach to this 
inquiry under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding114 when 
making the required “objective assessment of the facts of the case.”115 
The Appellate Body recognized that the panel did not establish that 
anticipated export earnings were actually conditioned on export 
performance, “but, rather, it found that those criteria helped to 
demonstrate the existence of de facto contingency” enough to satisfy 
the standard of Article. 3.1(a).116 The Appellate Body thus endorsed 
the less stringent but-for standard. 
2. Australia – Automotive Leather II and the Close-Connection 
Test. In Australia – Automotive Leather II, the panel considered two 
issues: (1) whether grant payments by the Australian government to 
Howe, an Australian leather producer, that were dependent on 
aggregate sales performance targets met the Footnote 4 standard of 
being contingent in fact upon export performance, and (2) whether a 
low-cost loan to Howe was contingent in fact upon export 
performance.117 The panel emphasized that, in determining whether 
de facto export subsidization exists, it considers all facts and 
circumstances surrounding the subsidy in making its decision.118 In 
considering such facts, the panel noted Footnote 4’s requirement that 
the subsidy be “tied to” actual or anticipated export earnings, which 
the panel interpreted to require a “close connection” between the 
grant or maintenance of a subsidy and export performance.119 
In applying this close-connection test to the Australian 
government’s grant payments, the panel considered three factors. 
First, the Australian government was aware that Howe “exported a 
significant portion of its production.”120 Second, the Australian 
market was too small to absorb Howe’s production.121 Thus, to meet 
 
 113. Canada – Aircraft Appellate Body Report, supra note 98, ¶ 220(b) (alteration in 
original) (emphasis added) (quoting SCM Agreement art. 3.1(a)). 
 114. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. 
 115. Id. art. 11. 
 116. Canada – Aircraft Appellate Body Report, supra note 98, ¶ 178. 
 117. Australia – Automotive Leather II Panel Report, supra note 103, ¶¶ 2.3–2.4. 
 118. Id. ¶ 9.56. 
 119. Id. ¶ 9.55. 
 120. Id. ¶ 9.66. 
 121. Id. ¶ 9.67. 
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the sales targets, Howe would “have to continue and probably 
increase exports” to “reach the sales performance targets.”122 
Australia argued that the size of the domestic market “would penalize 
small economies where firms are often dependent on exports,” an 
argument which the panel found unavailing.123 Third, given that Howe 
was “the only dedicated producer and exporter of automotive leather 
in Australia” and was the only company receiving the subsidies, these 
facts supported the conclusion that the subsidy was conditioned on 
anticipated exportation.124 
In applying the de facto standard to the low-cost loan, the panel 
emphasized that “[t]here [was] nothing in the loan contract that 
explicitly link[ed] the loan to Howe’s production or sales, and 
therefore nothing . . . that would tie the loan directly to export 
performance.”125 Moreover, that repayment of the loan could come 
from funds generated from export earnings was also inadequate to 
establish a sufficiently close tie between the loan and the anticipated 
exportation.126 
The panel’s holding regarding loan agreement seems to conflict 
with the holding in Canada – Aircraft. In Canada – Aircraft, the 
Appellate Body determined a loan agreement to be tied to 
anticipated export earnings,127 whereas in Australia – Automotive 
Leather II, the panel reviewing substantially similar facts did not find 
de facto contingency.128 This suggests that the but-for test is more 
likely to find de facto export subsidies than the close-connection test. 
Given that the but-for test is the only test adopted thus far by the 
Appellate Body, developing countries should take extensive 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. ¶ 9.69. 
 125. Id. ¶ 9.74. 
 126. See id. ¶ 9.75. 
 127. Canada – Aircraft Appellate Body Report, supra note 98, ¶ 220(b). 
 128. Australia – Automotive Leather II Panel Report, supra note 103, ¶ 10.1(a). In Australia 
– Automotive Leather II, just like in Canada – Aircraft, the WTO panel was presented with facts 
including a low-cost, below-market-rate loan to an industry highly geared toward exportation. 
Compare notes 117–26 and accompanying text (discussing the loan involved in Australia – 
Automotive Leather II), with notes 104–10 and accompanying text (introducing the loan at issue 
in Canada – Aircraft). In Canada – Aircraft, there was de facto contingency and thus a WTO 
violation. See Canada – Aircraft Appellate Body Report, supra note 98, ¶ 220(b). In Australia – 
Automotive Leather II, there was not. See Australia – Automotive Leather II Panel Report, 
supra note 103, ¶¶ 220(b), 221. 
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precautions when reforming their EPZ regimes to guard against a 
WTO challenge of de facto export subsidization. 
Even though the Appellate Body adopted the but-for test, the 
close-connection test retains importance for developing countries 
because Appellate Body decisions are not binding precedential 
authority, but rather can be only strongly persuasive authority.129 
Thus, countries should be aware of both tests, albeit with more 
attention paid to the but-for test, both because it is easier to violate 
WTO law under this test and because the Appellate Body has applied 
it. 
D. Key Implications of WTO Decisions for Reforming EPZs 
1. Legislative Paths to Compliance.  To make EPZ statutes WTO-
compliant, two of the most straightforward legislative reform 
possibilities are (1) the elimination of fiscal incentives, and (2) the 
elimination of export requirements. The first reform eliminates the 
EPZ subsidy completely. Because Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement 
requires a “financial contribution” in order to find a subsidy, 
eliminating all fiscal incentives makes the EPZs WTO-compliant.130 
The second reform eliminates the contingency of the subsidy on 
exports and thus removes it from the scope of Article 3.1(a). Fiscal 
incentives without export requirements are actionable within the 
meaning of the SCM Agreement because of their geographic 
specificity,131 but they are not “prohibited.”132 Hence, the actionable 
subsidies will violate the SCM Agreement only if they cause injury to 
other WTO members.133 In the absence of an export requirement, an 
EPZ’s fiscal incentives are unlikely to produce such injurious effects, 
 
 129. See Legal Effect of Panel and Appellate Body Reports and DSB Recommendations and 
Rulings: 7.2 Legal Status of Adopted/Unadopted Reports in Other Disputes, WORLD TRADE 
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c7s2p1_e.htm (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2013) (“[T]he reports of panels and the Appellate Body are not binding 
precedents for other disputes between the same parties on other matters or different parties on 
the same matter, even though the same questions of WTO law might arise. . . . If the reasoning 
developed in the previous report in support of the interpretation given to a WTO rule is 
persuasive from the perspective of the panel or the Appellate Body in the subsequent case, it is 
very likely that the panel or the Appellate Body will repeat and follow it.”). 
 130. See SCM Agreement art. 1.1. 
 131. See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text. 
 132. See SCM Agreement art. 2.2 (establishing specificity for those subsidies limited to 
geographic areas). 
 133. See id. art. 5 (“No Member should cause, through the use of any [specific subsidy], 
adverse effects to the interests of other Members . . . .”). 
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reducing the risk that the incentives could be successfully challenged 
before a WTO dispute-settlement panel.134 
2. Implications of the De Facto Standard of Export Subsidization.  
The panel and Appellate Body decisions regarding de facto export 
subsidization limit EPZ reform options in two principal ways. First, 
the decisions caution against using economic-performance 
requirements as alternatives to export requirements. Performance 
requirements for export-oriented industries, such as sales targets, job-
creation requirements, or minimum-investment requirements, will 
likely support an inference that EPZ subsidies are tied to export 
earnings because a company may be forced to export its products to 
meet these economically oriented conditions.135 If a panel applies the 
close-connection test, any economic output requirement will likely be 
analogized to the aggregate sales targets in Australia – Automotive 
Leather II and found incompatible with WTO law.136 
Second, the decisions caution against heavy governmental 
control and monitoring of EPZ exports. The factors considered in 
Canada – Aircraft included high governmental interest in export 
earnings and requirements that companies distinguish between 
domestic and foreign sales when applying for subsidies.137 
Governments should thus not obligate export reports from companies 
in order to receive or renew EPZ permits.138 Governments should also 
 
 134. See GABRIEL GARI, INTER-AM. DEV. BANK, POLICY BRIEF NO. IDB-PB-138, THE 
USE OF FREE ZONES FOR THE PROMOTION OF THE OFFSHORE INDUSTRY IN MERCOSUR 
COUNTRIES: A REASONABLE CHOICE? 36 (2011), available at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/
wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=36837059 (“[F]ree zone incentives have not been the 
subject of any GATT/WTO claims.”). 
 135. See Canada – Aircraft Appellate Body Report, supra note 98, ¶ 171 (defining “tie” as 
limiting or restricting behavior). 
 136. See Australia – Automotive Leather II Panel Report, supra note 103, ¶ 9.67 (noting that 
having to increase production to meet economic targets counsels in favor of finding export 
subsidization). 
 137. Canada – Aircraft Panel Report, supra note 104, ¶ 9.341. 
 138. Countries should avoid conditionality, as used in Article 3.1(a), when awarding EPZ 
licenses. Several hypothetical scenarios help to illustrate the concept of conditionality. First, if 
the facts demonstrate that a developing country systematically awards EPZ permits to those 
companies that submit applications with high anticipated exports and deny permits to those 
companies with applications reporting low anticipated exports, this would tend to demonstrate 
that export performance is a de facto condition for the subsidies. Second, if a developing 
country routinely exerts pressure on companies to boost exports while threatening to revoke 
EPZ licenses, this too would be closer to demonstrating de facto contingency. Third, if EPZ 
companies that did not export have their EPZ permits revoked without explanation, this would 
also tend to show that export performance is a condition of receiving the subsidies. All three 
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avoid making export promotion the central legislative or policy focus 
of their EPZ regime but focus instead on nonexport benefits of EPZ 
systems.139 
Countries can also take other, smaller actions to limit exposure 
to liability for de facto export subsidization by learning from the 
factors applied in Canada – Aircraft and Australia – Automotive 
Leather II. By encouraging companies to sell locally, changing the 
goals of EPZ systems to be worker advancement and job creation 
instead of export earnings, eliminating constant boasts about exports, 
and possibly even changing “Export” in EPZ to a more neutral term, 
countries will steer themselves toward WTO compliance. Overall, 
countries should carefully monitor how they associate their fiscal 
incentives with exports to ensure they are not implying that exports 
are a condition of their incentive regimes. 
3. Taking Advantage of the Limited Scope of the SCM Agreement.  
Countries should recognize that the SCM Agreement applies only to 
trade in goods.140 Subsidies for services, such as financial services or 
the establishment of international call centers, are outside the SCM 
Agreement’s scope. Panama took advantage of this distinction by 
retaining fiscal incentives for service providers in its reformed EPZ 
law.141 Although service sector companies have thus far played a 
relatively small role in EPZ systems,142 services are among the fastest-
growing sectors in some countries, with service-sector workers 
earning higher-than-average salaries.143 Carlos Zúñiga, the Director of 
Operations for Nicaragua’s EPZ system, emphasized that one of 
 
scenarios would tend to show facts that demonstrate export performance as a de facto condition 
of subsidies. 
 139. For examples of EPZ statutes listing benefits other than exports, see infra note 229. 
 140. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD Series on Issues in 
International Investment Agreements: Incentives, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2003/5, at 12 
(2004) (“The SCM Agreement applies only to subsidies that affect trade in goods.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 141. See Law To Establish a Special, Integrated and Simplified Regime for the 
Establishment and Operation of Free Zones and Other Dispositions, Ley No. 32, 5 Apr. 2011, 
ch. V, art. 33, GACETA OFICIAL No. 26757-B (Panama) (granting income tax exemptions to 
service corporations even after the WTO compliance deadline of December 31, 2015). 
 142. See FAROLE, supra note 32, at 77 fig.3.5 (presenting graphical data demonstrating that 
the services industry is smaller than the textiles and manufacturing industries in most EPZ 
systems). 
 143. Theresa Bradley, Latin American Offshoring Drives Gains amid Crisis, VICTORIA 
ADVOC., (Apr. 12, 2009, 5:07 PM) (noting that the “starting salary of $500 a month” in a 
Managua call center is “more than triple the country’s average wage”). 
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Nicaragua’s most prosperous paths to development is the growth of 
the international business-services sector in its EPZs.144 Moreover, 
research has demonstrated that developing better business services 
tends to encourage more successful manufacturing exports.145 
Whichever path countries choose to pursue in reforming their EPZ 
law, they will retain the option to continue to offer fiscal incentives to 
service providers. 
III.  THE POLICY AND LEGAL INADEQUACIES OF PAST ATTEMPTS 
AT ACHIEVING WTO COMPLIANCE 
Because EPZs directly impact essential aspects of economic 
development such as job creation and foreign direct investment, any 
change to an EPZ statute has the potential to influence the 
livelihoods of a nation’s workers, either by ensuring the workers earn 
a sustainable income or by potentially driving them into poverty. 
With so much at stake, reforming EPZ statutes to meet legal 
obligations is just the beginning of EPZ reform. Governments must 
also consider the policy consequences of potential reforms. 
This Part examines the critical policy consequences of EPZ 
reform, followed by a discussion of how the EPZ reforms of Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, and Panama may not be fully compliant with the 
obligations of Article 3.1(a) and also how these EPZ reforms fail to 
adequately address the impacts of reform on domestic policy. Section 
A argues that countries must consider policy implications such as 
investor flight and harm to domestic industries before drafting new 
EPZ statutes. Section B explains why the EPZ reforms of Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, and Panama may not be fully WTO-compliant and may 
not be wise policy choices. 
A. Governments Must Consider the Policy Consequences of EPZ 
Reform 
The looming deadline to reform EPZ statutes has led to rising 
tensions at the WTO over whether countries must completely 
eliminate subsidies from their EPZ statutes or simply modify them. 
 
 144. Telephone Interview with Carlos Zúñiga, supra note 5. 
 145. See Esteban Ferro, Alberto Portugal-Perez & John S. Wilson, Aid to the Services 
Sector: Does It Affect Manufacturing Exports? 3 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 5728, 2011), available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-
9450-5728 (presenting empirical data showing “a positive effect of aid to services on 
downstream manufacturing exports of developing countries”). 
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For example, when the Dominican Republic admitted that it had not 
yet reformed its EPZ statute and that it would “review and/or 
withdraw some of the incentives,” Colombia pressed the Dominican 
Republic on why the word “withdraw” was not enough.146 Colombia 
added, perhaps somewhat aggressively, “As we all know . . . the final 
two-year phase-out period . . . shall end not later than 31 December 
2015.”147 Colombia had begun eliminating the fiscal incentives of its 
EPZ regime in 2007,148 and wanted the Dominican Republic to do the 
same. The Dominican Republic, which previously failed to pass EPZ 
reform, promised to take action soon.149 
As countries like the Dominican Republic consider legislative 
action under pressure from other countries, the two straightforward 
paths to compliance—eliminating either fiscal incentives or export 
requirements—highlight two key policy implications that countries 
should consider: (1) the potential flight of foreign investment due to 
the removal of fiscal incentives, and (2) the potential harm to 
domestic industries resulting from the removal of export 
requirements. 
First, the elimination of EPZ fiscal incentives may result in lower 
investment by foreign companies. Fiscal incentives weigh heavily in 
corporate decisionmaking.150 Because most corporate income tax rates 
in developing countries are between 25 percent and 30 percent,151 the 
net present value of income tax exemptions can reach $20 million for 
a twenty-year exemption period.152 In addition, investors have ranked 
the level of corporate taxes as one of the “most important criteria” 
for their investment decisions.153 
The complete elimination of fiscal incentives could contribute to 
an exodus of companies to neighboring countries, especially when 
considering that countries within the same geographic region will 
 
 146. Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Replies to the Questions from 
Colombia Concerning the Updating Notification of the Dominican Republic, 
G/SCM/Q3/DOM/18, at 2 (Oct. 4, 2012). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See L. 1004, diciembre 30, 2005, art. 240-1, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O] edición 46.138, at 
96, 97 (Colom.) (increasing the corporate income tax rate for EPZ companies from 0 to 15 
percent). 
 149. See Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 146, at 2 (“The 
plan is to resubmit the draft to Congress in the next few days.”). 
 150. FAROLE, supra note 32, at 146. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 147. 
 153. Id. 
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reach the Annex VII phaseouts at different times depending on when 
they reach the $1,000 GNI threshold.154 The “gaps” in differing 
phaseouts are significant: Costa Rica, for example, will reach its 
phaseout on December 31, 2015, while its northern neighbor, 
Nicaragua, does not expect to reach its phaseout until 2025 or later.155 
Because relocation is a plausible option for companies,156 at least 
some government leaders would prefer to maintain the fiscal 
incentives.157 Relocation is feasible for companies, in part, because 
developing countries maintain “investment promotion agencies” that 
specialize in assisting companies to establish themselves efficiently 
and quickly.158 
Second, if, to avoid the flight of foreign businesses, countries 
choose instead to eliminate export requirements, they may cause 
harm to domestic businesses. Leonardo Martinez, the head of one of 
Nicaragua’s premier microfinance organizations, considers the 
statutory export requirements for EPZ companies to be vital to the 
health of small businesses in Nicaragua, which create about four 
hundred thousand jobs.159 Due to the low cost structure, advanced 
technologies, and economies of scale of EPZ companies, the ability of 
EPZ companies to sell locally has the potential to raise 
unemployment among workers who depend upon small businesses for 
income.160 Many small businesses produce apparel and footwear 
products similar to those manufactured by EPZ companies.161 As a 
result, EPZ companies would be in direct competition with small 
 
 154. But see Milner, supra note 37, at 231 (“[T]he net value of exports to an economy may 
be lower in the presence of ‘subsidies’ than in their absence. . . . [F]iscal incentives tend to be at 
the expense of resources for the development of greater marketing skills, export market 
information, and export marketing and promotion activities.”). 
 155. Telephone Interview with Carlos Zúñiga, supra note 5. 
 156. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 157. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Carlos Zúñiga, supra note 5 (noting that the 
“preference” would be to keep fiscal incentives). 
 158. See, e.g., About PRONicaragua, PRONICARAGUA, http://www.pronicaragua.org/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=25&Itemid=141&lang=en (last visited Sept. 
23, 2013) (explaining that ProNicaragua is ready to assist investors in “general start-up 
facilitation services,” “customized site visits,” “[c]omplete [i]nformation on business 
opportunities,” and “aftercare services,” among other services). 
 159. Telephone Interview with Leonardo Martinez, Exec. Dir. and Founder, Alternativa 
Microfinance (Nov. 7, 2012). Martinez has twenty years of experience working with over 1,500 
small- and medium-sized businesses in Nicaragua. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
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producers.162 Martinez described Nicaragua’s Annex VII phase-out 
period as “very worrisome,”163 even though Nicaragua is still far from 
reaching the $1,000 GNI per capita requirement that will trigger the 
phaseout.164 
Other countries share Martinez’s concerns. For example, the 
Philippines has enacted legislation that explicitly justifies the 
maintenance of export requirements as a way to protect domestic 
businesses.165 Bangladesh strictly monitors the movement of goods out 
of an EPZ because of “concerns regarding security and leaks of EPZ 
products into the local market.”166 And Ghana, which allows EPZ 
companies to sell products locally only with prior governmental 
approval,167 specifically safeguards the health of domestic enterprises 
by awarding them incentives to sell their goods to EPZ companies.168 
B. Past Attempts To Achieve WTO Compliance Have Been 
Inadequate from Both Legal and Policy Perspectives 
The confrontation between the Dominican Republic and 
Colombia discussed earlier in this Note169 represents not only rising 
tensions regarding EPZs but also some governments’ misdirected 
focus on eliminating fiscal incentives instead of conditioning them on 
factors other than export requirements. Although the complete 
elimination of incentives can benefit a country with increased 
revenues and resources for marketing EPZ systems,170 governments 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 24, ¶ 3 (listing 
Nicaragua’s GNI in 2010 as $616 in 1990 dollars). 
 165. An Act Providing for the Legal Framework and Mechanisms for the Creation, 
Operation, Administration, and Coordination of Special Economic Zones in the Philippines, 
Creating for this Purpose, the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), and for Other 
Purposes, Rep. Act. No. 7916, § 26 (Feb. 21, 1995), available at http://www.gov.ph/
1995/02/24/republic-act-no-7916/ (“[I]n order to protect the domestic industry, there shall be a 
negative list of Industries that . . . shall not be allowed to sell their products locally.”). 
 166. FAROLE, supra note 32, at 228. 
 167. See The Free Zone Act (Act No. 504/1995), § 23(1) (Aug. 31, 1995) (Ghana) (“The 
Minister may . . . authorize the sale of up to 30 percent of the annual production . . . to the 
national customs territory.”). 
 168. See id. § 24(2) (“A domestic enterprise shall be eligible to benefit from the prevailing 
export incentives available to a national exporter . . . for sale of any goods and services to 
enterprises in the free zone or single factory zone.”). 
 169. See supra notes 146–49 and accompanying text. 
 170. See Milner, supra note 37, at 231 (“[T]he fiscal incentives tend to be at the expense of 
resources for the development of greater marketing skills, export market information, and 
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should consider more nuanced potential reforms. Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, and Panama have each attempted to reform their EPZ 
regimes by taking a middle path without completely eliminating their 
fiscal incentives. This Note discusses both legal and policy reasons 
why these reforms may not be as effective as reforms based on CSR. 
These attempted reforms and their shortcomings will thus provide 
points of comparison for EPZ reforms based on conditions of CSR. 
1. Costa Rica.  In 2010, Costa Rica reformed its EPZ statute,171 
which, as a result of the amendment, stipulates that the income tax 
exemption for companies will expire on December 31, 2015.172 The 
amended EPZ statute makes two types of companies eligible for fiscal 
incentives. First, EPZ companies in “strategic sectors” as defined by 
the Costa Rican government will be entitled to fiscal incentives,173 
although subject to lower minimum-investment requirements if the 
company establishes itself in disadvantaged regions of the country.174 
Second, companies making an initial investment of at least $10 
million and employing at least one hundred workers will be awarded 
fiscal incentives.175 Fiscal incentives are greater if EPZ companies 
establish themselves in poor regions of the country.176 
 
export marketing and promotion activities.”). Some analysts suggest the additional tax revenue 
could be more important than any decreased competitiveness. See id. (“It is more important to 
use scarce resources to create an environment conducive to efficient production . . . than to 
subsidize exports . . . .”); see also FAROLE, supra note 32, at 173 (“[T]he evidence shows that 
incentives do not compensate for a poor investment climate. Thus, the significant government 
investment of financial resources . . . should be devoted to delivering quality services to 
investors . . . .”). 
 171. Modificación a la Ley de Régimen de Zonas Francas, No. 7210, de 23 de noviembre de 
1990 [Amendment to the Law of the Free Trade Zones Regime, No. 7210, of Nov. 23, 1990], 
Ley No. 8794, 22 enero 2010, LA GACETA, no. 15 (Costa Rica), available at 
http://www.gaceta.go.cr/pub/2010/01/22/COMP_22_01_2010.pdf. 
 172. See id. transitorio IV (describing that after Costa Rica’s exemption period ends, 
companies will be subject to the normal income tax schedules). 
 173. See id. art. 2(f) (noting that companies in strategic sectors will continue to benefit from 
fiscal incentives); see also V. Andrés Gómez, El Nuevo Régimen del Artículo 17 f) de la Ley del 
Régimen de Zonas Francas, PWC INTERAMÉRICAS TAX NEWS MENSUAL, June 1, 2011, at 1–2, 
available at http://www.pwc.com/ia/es/publicaciones/tax-news/assets/costa-rica-01-05-2011.pdf 
(commenting on Costa Rica’s law). 
 174. Amendment to the Law of the Free Trade Zones Regime, No. 7210, of Nov. 23, 1990 
art. 2(g). 
 175. Id. 
 176. See id. art. 1(a) (describing longer tax exemption periods for establishment in less 
developed regions of Costa Rica). 
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Costa Rica’s solution may expose it to challenges of de facto 
export subsidization. Its massive minimum-investment requirement of 
$10 million can be analogized to the sales performance requirements 
in Australia – Automotive Leather II, which were held as de facto 
export subsidies. Similar to Australia’s subsidies, Costa Rica’s high 
level of minimum investment combined with the tiny size of the Costa 
Rican market all but ensures that EPZ companies will export a 
substantial portion of their products. Costa Rica knows that its EPZs 
account for a large percentage of its exports—about 54 percent even 
after the decrease in exports due to the global economic 
slowdown177—and that EPZ companies will likely export many of 
their products. Both of these factors—substantial exports and a high 
likelihood of exports from companies receiving subsidies—are similar 
to factors considered by the Appellate Body in Canada – Aircraft in 
finding a violation of Article 3.1(a). Moreover, with respect to Costa 
Rica’s fiscal incentives for strategic sectors, the overly malleable 
criteria such as “quality employment”178 may prompt investigation 
into exactly how this standard is applied. 
From a policy perspective, Costa Rica’s law also suffers from 
shortcomings. The conditions for EPZ incentives do nothing to 
remedy potential harm to domestic industries that manifests as a 
result of eliminating export requirements.179 Additionally, the 
limitation of EPZ fiscal incentives to strategic enterprises and those 
companies that meet the minimum-investment requirements may 
limit investment by other smaller companies. 
2. El Salvador.  El Salvador, after rejecting a proposal to 
condition fiscal incentives on CSR,180 is taking a similar approach to 
Costa Rica in reforming its EPZ legislation. El Salvador recently 
 
 177. Exportaciones de Zona Franca Cayeron 7,7% a Noviembre, FEDERACIONES DE 
CÁMARAS Y ASOCIACIONES DE EXPORTADORES DE CENTROAMÉRICA, PANAMÁ Y EL CARIBE 
2, http://fecaexca.net/index.php?view=article&catid=64%3Acrnews&id=783%3Aexportaciones-
de-zona-franca-cayeron-77-a-noviembre&format=pdf&option=com_content&Itemid=87 (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2013). 
 178. Gómez, supra note 173, at 2 (author’s translation). 
 179. See supra notes 159–63 and accompanying text. 
 180. See Claudia Contreras, Reformas a Ley de Zonas Francas de El Salvador Privilegian 
Inversión Afuera de San Salvador, REVISTA SUMMA (Oct. 11, 2011, 9:04 AM) 
http://www.revistasumma.com/economia/17973-reformas-a-ley-de-zonas-francas-de-el-salvador-
privilegia-inversion-afuera-de-san-salvador.html (quoting Giovanni Berti, Director of the 
Investment Promotion Agency of El Salvador (PROESA), as rejecting incentives based on CSR 
as being prone to “inefficiency,” “corruption,” and “abuse” (author’s translation)). 
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approved a law that will condition its fiscal incentives on a minimum 
investment of $500,000 and a minimum job-creation requirement of 
fifty permanent jobs per business.181 Additionally, companies that 
locate in poor regions of the country will receive more generous fiscal 
incentives.182 As an incentive for increasing investment, El Salvador 
will extend the period of real estate tax exemptions for companies 
that double their initial investment after their initial year of 
operations.183 With such simple economic-performance requirements, 
it is likely that operations will continue as usual for many companies 
in El Salvador that will still continue to receive incentives under the 
reformed EPZ regime. 
El Salvador also exposes itself to liability for de facto export 
subsidization. Similar to Costa Rica, El Salvador’s EPZ companies 
will likely have no choice but to maintain or increase exports to 
comply with the minimum-investment floor or job-creation 
requirement. El Salvador’s economy is small184 and most likely cannot 
absorb the current levels of subsidized production, which was a factor 
supporting de facto subsidization in Canada – Aircraft. Additionally, 
El Salvador boasts heavily about its exports,185 which strengthens the 
case for satisfying the but-for test. Though El Salvador is likely not 
acting in bad faith,186 its business-as-usual solution certainly raises the 
potential for a WTO complaint alleging de facto subsidization, 
 
 181. Reformas a la Ley de Zonas Francas Industriales y de Comercialización [Reforms to 
the Law of Industrial and Commercialization Free Zones] art. 16, Dictamen No. 115, 11 Feb. 
2013, available at http://190.120.11.202/sesion-plenaria/seguimiento/legislatura-2012-2015/2013/
no.-38-del-21-feb-2013/dictamenes/comision-de-hacienda-y-especial-del-presupuesto/comision-
de-hacienda-y-especial-del-presupuesto-dictamen-115-favorable. For purposes of comparison, 
Costa Rica’s minimum-investment requirement of $10 million discussed above is twenty times 
higher than that of El Salvador’s $500,000 requirement. 
 182. See id. art. 15(d) (noting that companies outside of metropolitan areas receive twenty 
years of full tax exemption instead of only fifteen years).  
 183. See id. art. 15(f) (giving an additional five years of exemption to companies that double 
their investments over their initial exemption period). 
 184. In 2011, El Salvador’s GNI measured only $21.8 billion. 1.1 World Development 
Indicators: Size of the Economy, WORLD BANK (2013), http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/1.1#. 
 185. El Salvador’s government maintains a website dedicated solely to promoting their 
export statistics, export procedures, and other export-related items. AGENCIA DE PROMOCIÓN 
DE EXPORTACIONES E INVERSIONES DE EL SALVADOR, http://exportaciones.proesa.gob.sv (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2013). 
 186. See Contreras, supra note 180 (noting that El Salvador had “30 meetings” with business 
leaders in attempts to agree on EPZ reform (author’s translation)). 
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especially in light of tense confrontations between developing 
countries regarding EPZ reforms.187 
El Salvador’s solution also suffers from similar policy 
shortcomings as Costa Rica’s. Instead of conditioning fiscal incentives 
on CSR, El Salvador’s proposal does nothing to mitigate the potential 
negative impacts that EPZ reform will have on domestic industries.188 
It may also fail to provide investors with the legal certainty they crave 
by adopting an unimaginative solution vulnerable to a WTO 
challenge. 
3. Panama.  Panama reformed its EPZ law to eliminate some 
fiscal incentives but not others. It has eliminated the income tax 
exemption for the manufacturing sector, but it will continue to award 
EPZ companies financial contributions through tax-free importation 
of production equipment.189 Panama may have relied on Footnote 1 of 
the SCM Agreement in believing this exemption is outside the scope 
of the SCM Agreement.190 Footnote 1, however, most likely applies to 
products, not production equipment.191 Although the provision has 
never been interpreted by the WTO, commentators note that the 
views of the SCM Committee support the contention that it applies to 
products, not production equipment.192 Panama could also argue that 
tax-free exemptions for production equipment are not included in the 
illustrative list of export subsidies set forth in Annex I of the SCM 
Agreement.193 But the list in Annex I is illustrative, not exhaustive.194 
 
 187. For a description of the confrontation between the Dominican Republic and Colombia 
over the future of EPZ systems, see supra notes 146–49 and accompanying text. 
 188. For details on how CSR may address impacts on domestic industries, see infra notes 
212–15. 
 189. See Law To Establish A Special, Integrated and Simplified Regime for the 
Establishment and Operation of Free Zones and Other Dispositions, Ley No. 32, 5 Apr. 2011, 
ch. V, art. 31, GACETA OFICIAL No. 26757-B. 
 190. See SCM Agreement art. 1.1(a)(1)(ii) n.1 (“[T]he exemption of an exported product 
from duties or taxes . . . shall not be deemed to be a subsidy.”). This exemption extends to 
imported inputs for finished products. See Raúl A. Torres, Free Zones and the World Trade 
Organization Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 2 GLOBAL TRADE & 
CUSTOMS J. 217, 221 (2007) (“[D]uty exemptions on inputs are permitted under 
Footnote 1 . . . .”). 
 191. See Torres, supra note 190, at 221 (“[Footnote 1] do[es] not provide coverage for 
exemptions and remissions of duties and indirect taxes on capital goods used in the production 
process of the exported product.”). 
 192. Creskoff & Walkenhorst, supra note 2, at 34. 
 193. See SCM Agreement Annex I. Illustrative examples listed in Annex I include, direct 
subsidies, provision of freight charges, tax exemptions and deferrals, and special deductions, 
among others. Id. 
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Hence, although Panama may have diminished its competitiveness by 
eliminating the income tax exemption for EPZ companies, it still 
subsidizes its EPZ companies within the meaning of the SCM 
Agreement.195 
Panama’s statute includes several provisions that may support 
claims of de facto export subsidization. The Panamanian National 
Commission for EPZs reviews all applications by EPZ applicants and 
either approves or denies them.196 To initially obtain and then 
maintain approval, a company must submit a detailed report to the 
SCM Commission with information on how it will operate197 and on its 
“principal markets of destination.”198 A WTO panel may view these 
provisions as evidence that the Panamanian government concerns 
itself with the location in which a company sells products. Under the 
but-for test of Canada – Aircraft, this monitoring structure may 
convince a panel that the subsidies would not have been granted but 
for anticipated exports,199 especially given that the Panamanian 
government identifies one of its primary goals on its website as 
“promotion of the export[] of national products.”200 This export-
oriented goal may tip the balance further in favor of de facto export 
subsidization as interpreted by the WTO. 
As a policy matter, Panama has potentially left itself exposed to 
a WTO dispute while diminishing its competitiveness by eliminating 
major fiscal incentives. Panama’s lower fiscal incentives may deflect 
investment, its elimination of de jure export requirements may harm 
 
 194. Annex I is entitled “Illustrative List of Export Subsidies.” Id.  
 195. The subsidies for tax-free importation production equipment would qualify as subsidies 
under Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement, thus exposing Panama to liability for a de facto 
inquiry based on the legal standards established by Canada – Aircraft and Australia – 
Automotive Leather II. 
 196. See Law To Establish A Special, Integrated and Simplified Regime for the 
Establishment and Operation of Free Zones and Other Dispositions, Ley No. 32, 5 Apr. 2011, 
ch. II, art. 6, GACETA OFICIAL No. 26757-B (“The National Commission of Free Zones will 
have the following functions: . . . approving or canceling the operation licenses and development 
licenses of the free zones and the licenses of the established businesses therein.” (author’s 
translation)). 
 197. See id. ch. III, art. 19(7) (requiring a report with a “description of the objectives, 
activities, structures, organization, and services of the business” (author’s translation)). 
 198. Id. ch IV, art. 28(7) (author’s translation). 
 199. See Canada – Aircraft Panel Report, supra note 104, ¶ 9.340 (discussing the but-for 
test). 
 200. About Proinvex, PAN. TRADE & INVESTMENT AGENCY, http://proinvex.mici.gob
.pa/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=93&Itemid=55&lang=en (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2013). 
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its domestic industries, and its monitoring of export destinations may 
expose it to de facto export subsidization challenges. By not providing 
investors legal certainty and offering them reduced fiscal incentives, 
Panama may find itself relying on its strategic location rather than its 
EPZ statute to attract investment. 
IV.  REFORMING WTO STATUTES BY CONDITIONING EPZ 
INCENTIVES ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
For decades, many commentators have criticized the global 
trading system for questionable business practices such as the 
provision of inadequate working conditions or the exploitation of 
environmental resources. As the global community strives to tackle 
these concerns, the upcoming WTO deadline for EPZ reform 
conveniently presents an opportunity to advance labor and 
environmental rights. As explained below, by reforming EPZ statutes 
and conditioning fiscal incentives on standards of CSR, government 
leaders have the potential to harness competitive market forces for 
the advancement of corporate citizenship. Using this approach, not 
only will government leaders be able to fulfill their legal and policy 
goals, but they will also have the potential to bring progressive change 
to the global trading system. 
This Part sets forth a path to making EPZ statutes WTO-
compliant by conditioning EPZ incentives on standards of CSR. 
Section A introduces and elaborates upon the granularity of CSR. 
Section B details how countries are able to use CSR standards in their 
EPZ statutes in a way that satisfies WTO requirements and makes for 
sound public policy. Finally, Section C anticipates and responds to 
potential counterarguments to the proposal of conditioning EPZ 
incentives on CSR. 
A. An Introduction to CSR 
CSR generally refers to “the social obligations of companies, as 
citizens, . . . to the societies in which they are embedded.”201 Those 
obligations can be to employees, consumers, communities, or the 
environment.202 There is no single definition of CSR,203 and CSR 
 
 201. Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic 
Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 721 (2002). 
 202. Id. 
 203. See Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder 
Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL 
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obligations “vary by industry.”204 Even though the meaning of CSR 
differs across countries and cultures,205 the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO)206 has developed international CSR 
guidelines in its ISO 26000 Report for use by international 
companies.207 The ISO guidelines recommend CSR policies in seven 
core subject areas: (1) organizational governance, (2) human rights, 
(3) labor practices, (4) the environment, (5) fair operating policies, 
(6) consumer issues, and (7) community involvement and 
development.208 The ISO encourages countries to use these guidelines 
as a foundation for developing national CSR standards.209 For 
industries that are particularly prevalent in EPZs, such as textiles, 
footwear products, and light manufacturing, the critical CSR issues 
include labor conditions and the permissibility of worker 
unionization, among others.210 This Note will provide examples of two 
areas particularly important for EPZ reform: (1) labor practices, and 
(2) community involvement and development. 
First, the implementation of adequate labor practices is 
significant for the continued improvement of EPZs because the 
International Labor Organization has documented problems such as 
forced overtime work, the absence of remedy mechanisms for worker 
complaints, and unhealthy working conditions.211 Countries could 
address these issues by adopting regulations such as requiring 
companies to permit worker unionization, requiring companies to 
educate workers about their labor rights, mandating healthy and safe 
 
L. REV. 1195, 1195 (1999) (“For centuries legal, political, social, and economic commentators 
have debated corporate social responsibility . . . .”). 
 204. Williams, supra note 201, at 722. 
 205. INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., ISO SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
STANDARDIZATION: AN OUTLINE OF THE ISSUES 2 (2004). 
 206. The International Organization for Standardization was founded in 1947 and has 
published over 19,000 guidelines for international standardization. About ISO, INT’L ORG. FOR 
STANDARDIZATION, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2013). The 
ISO has 163 country members. Id.  
 207. See Int’l Org. for Standardization, Guidance on Social Responsibility, ISO/FDIS 
26000:2010(E) (2010). 
 208. Id. ¶ 6.1 fig.3. 
 209. See id. ¶ 1 (“This International Standard is intended to provide organizations with 
guidance concerning social responsibility and can be used as part of public policy 
activities. . . . This International Standard is not intended to prevent the development of 
national standards that are more specific, more demanding, or of a different type.”). 
 210. Williams, supra note 201, at 722. 
 211. See generally McCallum, supra note 4 (explaining inadequate labor conditions 
worldwide). 
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working conditions, and establishing administrative and enforcement 
mechanisms to receive, investigate, and address worker complaints. 
Conditioning fiscal incentives on these types of CSR issues would 
allow a country to maintain economic competitiveness while 
benefiting from the applicability of these CSR standards to 
companies. 
Second, community involvement and development, defined by 
the ISO as “an organization’s proactive outreach to the 
community,”212 is also critical to alleviate potential negative impacts 
that EPZs may have on some economic sectors in their host 
communities.213 Countries could encourage community involvement 
as a condition of fiscal incentives through community input forums 
and organizational participation in local government.214 Community-
development regulations could include the maintenance of social-
investment programs such as scholarships to promote education, 
business development programs for small businesses, or antipoverty 
programs.215 
B. A Path To Maintain Fiscal Incentives Conditioned upon CSR 
Conditioning fiscal incentives on objectively verifiable standards 
of CSR is an effective solution to EPZ reform for four reasons. First, 
unlike minimum-investment and job-creation requirements, CSR 
conditionality is fully compliant with Article 3.1(a) of the SCM 
Agreement; making fiscal incentives contingent on noneconomic 
criteria such as labor conditions, worker unionization, or social-
investment216 guarantees that an EPZ company can operate at any 
level of production without pressure, including producing only for 
domestic consumption if it chooses. As a result, any exports will be 
 
 212. Int’l Org. for Standardization, supra note 207, at 63. 
 213. For a discussion of the possible negative impacts of EPZs on host communities, see 
supra notes 159–63. 
 214. See Int’l Org. for Standardization, supra note 207, at 64 (listing “participat[ion] in local 
associations” as a potential action of community involvement). 
 215. See id. at 68 (describing various potential forms of “social investment” by companies). 
 216. These social criteria have goals that can be easily distinguished from economic-
performance requirements. Whereas economic-performance requirements have goals such as 
job creation and GNI growth that may depend upon export performance, the goals of increasing 
corporate citizenship, such as respect for workers’ human rights and humane working 
conditions, serve purposes completely disconnected from a company’s export performance. For 
a discussion of CSR as the fulfillment of obligations to various stakeholders in a community, see 
supra notes 201–02. The near nonexistent relationship between the goals of CSR and export 
performance will help developing countries avoid a WTO challenge to their EPZ statutes. 
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the result of a company’s own profit-maximization strategy, not a 
result of government-mandated job creation or economic-
performance rules.217 A company’s complete freedom to export its 
products or sell those products locally makes it much less likely that a 
WTO panel will find that fiscal incentives are tied in any way to 
exports, allowing governments to steer clear of de facto export 
subsidization under the but-for test or close-connection test.218 
CSR conditionality also enables both domestic and foreign 
companies to utilize EPZ systems, avoiding suspicions that smaller, 
nonexporting firms are excluded from EPZ systems. With a large 
minimum-investment requirement such as $10 million, Costa Rica 
will be essentially limiting its EPZ systems to large, export-oriented 
firms. In contrast, using CSR opens EPZ systems to companies of all 
sizes by not being tied to economic-performance requirements. This 
noneconomic nature of CSR conditionality will also reduce a 
country’s exposure to WTO liability for de facto export subsidization 
by conditioning financial incentives on factors that—unlike job-
creation requirements—a WTO dispute settlement panel is less likely 
to analogize to the sales targets found problematic in Australia – 
Automotive Leather II.219 
Second, CSR conditionality will give investors legal certainty. A 
country offering business-as-usual incentive packages may seem 
facially more attractive than a country offering incentives based on 
CSR conditionality,220 but investors also place a high premium on 
legal certainty.221 Because CSR conditionality is likely to be 
compatible with the SCM Agreement, it offers investors this security. 
EPZ investors make initial investment decisions with long-term 
 
 217. As long as companies choose to export their products without restrictions on their 
behavior, this will likely not be deemed a violation of the SCM Agreement. See SCM 
Agreement art. 3.1(a) n.4 (noting that awarding subsidies to companies that export shall not be 
sufficient to be deemed an export subsidy). 
 218. For a discussion of the differences between the but-for and close-connection tests, see 
supra Parts II.C.1–2. 
 219. See Australia – Automotive Leather II Panel Report, supra note 103, ¶ 9.67 (discussing 
sales performance targets and how they will likely lead companies to have to export in order to 
meet them). 
 220. For a critique of the argument that CSR conditionality will reduce the competitiveness 
of developing countries, see infra Part IV.C. 
 221. See, e.g., Rodriguez Yong, supra note 29, at 409 (“In 2008 the largest mining companies 
operating in Colombia warned the Colombian government that if it could not assure ‘legal 
stability with clear rules,’ they would abstain from making planned, future investments in the 
country worth $200 million.”). 
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future visions.222 Hence, legal certainty counsels in favor of CSR 
conditionality rather than economic-performance requirements. As 
an added bonus, companies can also build goodwill with consumers 
by demonstrating that they are investing in countries where 
companies are held to certain labor codes and human rights 
standards.223 
Third, even though El Salvador discarded its initial idea of 
conditioning EPZ fiscal incentives on CSR for being “complex,”224 
enforceable options based on objective factors exist. As previously 
mentioned, objective criteria for CSR conditionality could include 
adopting strong workers’ rights codes, guaranteeing the right to 
worker unionization, or requiring a certain investment in 
microfinance activities to offset a potential rise in the unemployment 
rate among small business owners.225 In addition, national EPZ 
commissions are well-equipped with statutory monitoring and 
investigative powers to make sure companies satisfy these criteria.226  
Fourth, regardless of which objective factors governments 
choose, CRS conditionality will give the international community—
including EPZ companies in other countries, other governments, and 
the WTO—an interest in enforcing those CSR standards. In essence, 
CSR conditionality will harness competitive market forces to support 
the enforcement of CSR standards. No EPZ company in Colombia, 
for example, will want EPZ competitors in the Dominican Republic 
to gain an economic advantage by receiving fiscal incentives without 
holding up their end of the EPZ bargain. In this way, CSR 
 
 222. Though EPZ investors make their initial investment decisions based on long-term 
horizons, they are still able and willing to relocate if the assumptions on which their long-term 
investment decisions were based change. For instance, industries have fled from Honduras to 
Nicaragua based on changing business conditions. See supra note 28. 
 223. See European Competitiveness Report 2008, at 106–18, COM (2008) 774 (2009) 
(providing an overview of the links between CSR and competitiveness); The Rankings, BETTER 
WORLD SHOPPER, http://www.betterworldshopper.com/rankings.html (last visited Sept. 23, 
2013) (ranking top companies for records of CSR, including apparel and footwear 
manufacturers that are especially prevalent in EPZ regimes). 
 224. Contreras, supra note 180 (author’s translation). 
 225. See supra Part IV.A. 
 226. See, e.g., Law To Establish a Special, Integrated and Simplified Regime for the 
Establishment and Operation of Free Zones and Other Dispositions, Ley No. 32, 5 Apr. 2011, 
ch. IV, art. 28(7), GACETA OFICIAL No. 26757-B (Panama) (giving EPZ commissions extensive 
information-gathering powers within EPZs). 
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conditionality may spark discussions about increased transparency 
and monitoring in the global trading system.227 
In conclusion, although current reforms eliminate de jure export 
subsidization, they nonetheless expose countries to significant 
potential liability for de facto export subsidization based on the tests 
applied in Canada – Aircraft and Australia – Automotive Leather II. 
CSR conditionality, in contrast, reduces this liability, promotes legal 
certainty, and has the potential to harness competitive market forces 
to enforce workers’ rights around the world. 
C. Potential Counterarguments to CSR Conditionality Do Not 
Withstand Scrutiny 
Those skeptical of CSR conditionality will likely raise three 
potential counterarguments: conditionality (1) may not meet the but-
for test of Canada – Aircraft, (2) will make graduating countries less 
economically competitive than their counterparts who do not adopt 
CSR conditionality, and (3) is too complex to be managed by 
understaffed, under-resourced governments of graduating countries. 
None of these arguments withstand any level of scrutiny. 
First, opponents may argue that CSR conditionality fails the but-
for test. Because many developing countries tend to have small 
domestic economies, the majority of EPZ products will likely be 
exported even in the absence of export requirements, leading to large 
export earnings for countries implementing CSR conditionality. 
Opponents will argue that these increased export earnings only have 
to be a condition, not the sole condition, for a finding of de facto 
export subsidization. They will argue that EPZ systems would be 
unlikely to exist if all companies sold 100 percent of their products 
domestically, making export earnings a but-for condition of the EPZ 
system’s existence.228 Thus, even if countries have more than one 
goal—such as improved corporate citizenship, job creation, and 
 
 227. The argument that EPZ companies in one country will enforce the CSR standards of 
their competitors in another country assumes transparency and an ability to monitor other 
companies in the global trading system. Although governmental commissions do have the tools 
necessary to monitor compliance, other private companies often will not. Further research could 
investigate collaborative ways to enforce such CSR conditionality on a private level. 
Nevertheless, the interests of private companies will still be strongly aligned with the 
enforcement of CSR conditionality. 
 228. See Canada – Aircraft Panel Report, supra note 104, ¶ 9.339 (noting that the de facto 
standard only requires the facts show that “had there been no expectation of export 
sales . . . ‘ensuing’ from the subsidy, the subsidy would not have been granted” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
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increased export earnings—export earnings would still be a but-for 
cause of the EPZ system. 
This argument fails because it unjustifiably assumes governments 
would eliminate EPZs absent export earnings. When graduating 
countries realize that EPZ companies may not export products 
without export requirements, factors such as economic growth and 
increasing the taxpayer base would likely continue to motivate 
governments to establish EPZs.229 No reason exists to assume that 
factors other than exports—employment creation or increased levels 
of CSR, for example—are not sufficient to justify maintenance of an 
EPZ system. Additionally, the burden of proof lies with the 
complaining country to show that the EPZ system would not exist but 
for export earnings.230 In a case of equipoise, the principle of good 
faith in WTO law counsels in favor of the responding country.231 
The opponents’ argument also fails because even if exports do 
result from EPZs, they are the product of profit-maximization 
strategies of individual companies, not governmental economic-
performance conditions such as those in Canada – Aircraft. Footnote 
4 of the SCM Agreement explicitly prohibits a finding of export 
subsidization simply because companies receiving subsidies happen to 
 
 229. Countries establish EPZs with an eye toward multiple factors, such as economic 
relationships with other countries, domestic economic growth, and general development. See, 
e.g., Ley No. 8-90 Sobre el Fomento de las Zonas Francas [Law No. 8-90 On the Promotion of 
Free Zones], GACETA OFICIAL NO. 9775, Jan. 15, 1990 (Dom. Rep.) (listing the creation of 
employment and income for the local population as the first goal of EPZs); Free Zone Act, 
LAWS OF ST. LUCIA, ch. 15.17, pmbl. (rev. ed. 2005) (listing “commerce, trade and investment 
with other countries,” “economic growth,” and “development” as purposes of the Act).  
 230. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 231. The principle of good faith underlies all WTO law. See Andrew D. Mitchell, Good 
Faith in WTO Dispute Settlement, 7 MELB. J. INT’L L., 339, 352 (2006) (noting that good faith 
“influences the interpretation of every WTO provision”). The Appellate Body has stated that 
panels should not presume that Members have acted in bad faith. See Appellate Body Report, 
Chile—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, ¶ 74, WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS110/AB/R (Dec. 13, 1999) 
(avoiding a “presumption of bad faith”). Additionally, Panels should presume that Members 
have acted in good faith in executing their WTO obligations “as required by the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda articulated in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention.” Appellate Body 
Report, European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines, ¶ 278, WT/DS231/AB/R (Sept. 
26, 2002). Hence, based on this principle of good faith engrained in WTO jurisprudence, dispute 
settlement tribunals should not infer that subsidies are conditioned from exports simply because 
subsidies are correlated with exports unless the presumption of WTO compliance is sufficiently 
rebutted by an “odbjective assessment of the facts of the case.” See DSU art. 11. When tribunals 
are unsure whether de facto export contingency exists, they should find in favor of the 
responding party. The burden is on the complaining party to present a prima facie case to rebut 
the presumption of good faith.  
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export.232 The lack of economic-performance conditions, coupled with 
substantial EPZ benefits apart from exports, makes any WTO 
challenge of de facto export subsidization to CSR conditionality 
extremely weak. 
Second, opponents may argue that CSR conditionality will 
reduce a graduating country’s economic competitiveness. Allowing 
worker unionization could lead to higher wages and/or more 
favorable schedules for workers. Creating standards of community 
integration, social investment, or superior labor conditions applicable 
to EPZ companies may add to a company’s operating costs. 
Opponents may thus argue that when a neighboring country offers 
EPZ incentives in exchange for simple minimum-investment 
requirements instead of CSR, the logical economic impulse for large 
companies will be to race to the bottom and accept minimum-
investment requirements.233 
This race-to-the-bottom argument ignores many nuances that 
guide EPZ investments. Investors value legal certainty in EPZ 
systems,234 and assurances of WTO compliance will help overcome 
any additional operating costs of implementing CSR standards. EPZ 
companies also benefit from low worker turnover, and CSR will likely 
help reduce turnover by implementing more worker-favorable 
policies.235 Experience also suggests that CSR will not prompt investor 
 
 232. SCM Agreement art. 3.1(a) n.4. 
 233. Compare Ray Kiely, The Race to the Bottom and International Labor Solidarity, 26 
REVIEW 67, 68 (2003) (“[C]apital is now so mobile that it bypasses nation-states, and invests 
where it can most benefit from low costs. Such benefits to capital may be low wages, low rates of 
taxation, and weak environmental regulation.”), with id. at 75 (labeling the race-to-the-bottom 
argument as “unconvincing” because the cost of labor is simply one factor of many that 
influence capital investment).  
 234. For an example of EPZ investors expressing the need for legal certainty, see supra note 
29. The importance of legal certainty is not unique to EPZ investors; rather, it can play a 
significant role in investment decisions more generally. See US Firms Decry Lack of Legal 
Certainty, JAKARTA POST (June 28, 2013, 2:14 PM), http://www.thejakartapost.com/
news/2013/06/28/us-firms-decry-lack-legal-certainty.html (“Expressing shared concerns over the 
investment climate in the country, a number of US multinational companies are expecting the 
Indonesian government to revamp the bureaucracy, ensure legal certainty and improve 
infrastructure.”). 
 235. See Zheng WeiBo, Sharan Kaur & Tao Zhi, A Critical Review of Employee Turnover 
Model (1938-2009) and Development in Perspective of Performance, 4 AFR. J. BUS. MGMT. 4146, 
4150 (2010) (listing as factors for worker retention “[t]he degree to which individuals like their 
jobs,” “[t]he nature of the work schedule,” and “[t]he degree to which the organization is 
perceived to be reputable and well-regarded”). Low worker turnover allows for the 
accumulation of human capital over time in EPZs. Higher retention rates among employees will 
result in lower costs for replacement hires and training. 
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flight; for example, some countries have already taken steps toward 
guaranteeing worker unionization without witnessing an exodus of 
investors.236 Lastly, to the extent that CSR conditions may slightly 
increase operating costs,237 countries can work to gain advantages in 
other areas important to EPZ investors.238 
Third, opponents may argue that CSR conditionality is too 
complex for under-resourced governments to manage. Similar to El 
Salvador’s perspective,239 opponents may view CSR conditionality as 
prone to corruption and requiring a system of monitoring and 
surveillance beyond the capability of developing countries. CSR 
conditionality, the argument goes, will thus be ineffective in 
promoting corporate citizenship. 
This argument fails to recognize the advanced capacities of 
developing-country governments for three reasons. First, many 
governments already monitor EPZ companies to collect a multitude 
of advanced statistical factors for economic analysis by central 
banks.240 Nothing prevents these governments from using the same 
 
 236. For example, Nicaragua forged an agreement in 2010 between the government, 
business leaders, and eight union leaders to increase wages, improve working conditions, and 
promote the well-being of EPZ workers and their families. See generally GARY GEREFFI & 
JENNIFER BAIR, CTR. ON GLOBALIZATION, GOVERNANCE & COMPETITIVENESS, 
STRENGTHENING NICARAGUA’S POSITION IN THE TEXTILE-APPAREL VALUE CHAIN: 
UPGRADING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CAFTA-DR REGION (2010), available at 
http://www.cggc.duke.edu/pdfs/2010-12-20_Gereffi_Bair_Nicaragua-apparel-report.pdf (setting 
forth a framework for social improvement within Nicaraguan EPZs). Nicaragua’s EPZs have 
continued to grow with this agreement, and might still be growing due to the predictability that 
the agreement has brought to Nicaragua by resolving labor disputes. See Gisella Canales Ewest, 
Empleo Récord en Zona Franca, LA PRENSA, http://www.laprensa.com.ni/2012/04/14/
activos/97886-record-zona-franca (last visited Sept. 23, 2013) (noting that employment in EPZs 
continues to increase and that the Tripartite Labor Commission’s efforts on behalf of workers 
has brought stability to labor relations issues). 
 237. Costs of compliance with CSR conditions may only be slight because the costs could be 
partly or fully offset by other gains, such as an improvement of relations with labor unions, 
fewer worker strikes, and thus more production. See Ewest, supra note 236 (implying that salary 
increases for workers has actually worked to boost investment because investors are enjoying 
healthy relations with workers, resulting in a predictable investment environment). 
 238. See FAROLE, supra note 32, at 117 (positing that a variety of factors influence EPZ 
investment, including, among other things, “infrastructure and administrative environment for 
firms,” the “governance environment” at a national level, and “the position of [EPZs] relative 
to national, regional, and global markets”).  
 239. El Salvador rejected CSR conditionality for being too “complex.” See supra note 224 
and accompanying text. 
 240. See, e.g., FAROLE, supra note 32, at 235 box 7.9 (“The Dominican Republic, like most 
countries with established [EPZ] programs, requires companies to provide information on their 
activities on a regular basis. . . . The Dominican Republic enforces the data requirements, so 
compliance rates are high.”). 
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monitoring capacities to enforce CSR conditionality. Second, 
governments already have experience drafting sophisticated 
legislation and regulations that govern their EPZ systems. These 
skills, combined with assistance from international organizations, will 
allow governments to implement well-drafted, enforceable 
regulations of CSR conditionality. Third, government investment 
agencies often have offices inside EPZs within walking distance of 
companies,241 making on-the-ground monitoring and complaint 
investigation very feasible. 
CONCLUSION 
As the phaseouts for export subsidy exemptions approach, 
developing countries must consider how to reform their EPZ statutes 
to meet both de jure and de facto standards of export subsidization. 
The touchstone limitations that the little-considered de facto standard 
imposes on developing countries include steering away from both 
economic-performance requirements and monitoring the export 
levels of EPZ companies. The two straightforward paths toward 
compliance explained in this Note that meet the de facto standard—
either eliminating fiscal incentives or export requirements—highlight 
the competing policy choices of maintaining levels of investment and 
safeguarding domestic industries. 
Because past attempts at EPZ reform may not meet the de facto 
standard, this Note has proposed conditioning EPZ fiscal incentives 
on standards of CSR to provide full WTO compliance. Conditioning 
fiscal incentives on objective standards of CSR presents a unique 
opportunity to harness competitive market forces for the enforcement 
of labor standards, workers’ unions, and ethical business practices. 
Other EPZ companies, other developing countries, the WTO, and the 
greater international community will be vigilant in ensuring that host 
countries enforce CSR conditions. It is likely that competitively 
minded EPZ companies will not hesitate to be whistleblowers that 
expose their competitors’ failures to uphold standards. When this 
private-market enforcement is coupled with the substantial statutory 
authority that national EPZ commissions possess to monitor and 
investigate EPZ companies, enforcement of a host country’s choice of 
 
 241. For example, the National Commission of Free Zones of Nicaragua has its home office 
located inside the largest EPZ in the country. See Contact Us, COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE ZONAS 
FRANCAS, http://www.cnzf.gob.ni/?q=en/contact-form (last visited Sept. 23, 2013) (listing the 
address of the Commission).  
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CSR standards becomes a very feasible possibility. Overall, EPZ 
reform is not a burden, but rather an opportunity to achieve WTO 
compliance while advancing corporate citizenship worldwide. 
Developing countries should act now to provide investors with legal 
certainty for their EPZ systems. 
